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WHAT LAWRENCE BROUGHT FOR ''SHOW 
AND TELL": THE NON-FUNDAMENTAL 
LIBERTY INTEREST IN A MINIMALLY 
ADEQUATE EDUCATION 
~ATTHEWA.BRUNELL* 
Abstract: In 1973, under an Equal Protection Clause challenge, the 
Supreme Court in San Antonio v. Rod1iguez held that education is not a 
fundamental right implicitly or explicitly found within the U.S. Con-
stitution. The substantiye due process jurisprudence of the Court's 2003 
term raises serious questions about the legal and theoretical under-
pinnings of Rodriguez. Lawrence v. Texas stands for a bold, new architecture 
that the Court may employ in future substantiye due process decisions. 
This Note argues that if the due process analysis forged in Lawrence is 
followed, the Supreme Court may reconsider its thirty-year-old Rodriguez 
decision, recognize the non-fundamental liberty interest in a minimally 
adequate education under the Due Process Clause, and proyide some 
relief to schoolchildren in grossly underperforming schools. 
INTRODUCTION 
Education is the highway that propels America, driving its busi-
nesses, delivering opportunity, and fueling its political, social, and 
moral conscience.1 Yet the American public school system is very 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL (2004-2005). The 
author wishes to thank Professor Cah'in Massey for his perception, my wife for her encour-
agement and my former students at C.O. Greenfield l\Iiddle School for their persistence. 
1 Richard Breeden, Older Is Seen as Better in Small-Business Owners, 'VALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 
2002, at B4 (reasoning that in "the U.S. especially, more education means more pay in the 
marketplace"); see also Will Pinkston, State's Liberal Charter School Law Puts It in the Top Five 
Nationwide, WALL ST.]., Nov. 10, 1999, at F4. The Raleigh-based Public School Forum of 
North Carolina epitomizes the business community's interest in creating an educated 
workplace. Id. California public schools, for example, receive private funding from a "core 
of business supporters who value education." FUI/ding Pllblic Education, Editorial, L.A. 
TIMES, May 19, 2002, at B18. Commenting on the fiftieth anniversary of Bmwll v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the current superintendent of the Topeka Unified School Dis-
trict 501 remarked that Bmwn's legacy has not been fulfilled and will not be until "our 
legislators truly understand what is involved in preparing all children for an equal oppor-
tunity in tomorrow's world." Tony Sawyer, Flexibility, Financing Mllst for Every Child, TOPEKA 
CAP.]., Feb. 14, 2004, at G2. 
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much a "non-system system," in which individual school districts prog-
ress at vastly different speeds.2 Many school districts in America, such 
as South Phoenix's Roosevelt School District, are marooned in the 
highway's breakdown lane.3 In neglecting these school districts, state 
legislatures have effectively abdicated their supervisory role in the de-
velopmen t of responsible citizenry, and in the process, excluded the 
poor from the opportunity of education.4 State courts are also often 
unhelpful, simply redirecting the problem to indifferent legislators.5 
Abysmally performing school systems like the Roosevelt School Dis-
trict suggest the need for greater federal intervention.6 However, the 
improbability of Congress passing a well-funded, comprehensive stat-
2 James Traub, The Test ,'v less, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 46 (noting 
that America "has never had an 'educational system'; what it has had is 15,000 or so school 
districts, which decide more or less for themselves how and what to teach and what stu-
dents need to learn in order to move from grade to grade, or to graduate"). 
3 See, e.g., C.O. Greenfield School: Arizona School Report Card 2003-04, at 6 (Ariz. 
Dep't of Educ. 2004), available at http://www.ade.az.gov/srcs/ReportCards/53762004.pdf 
(last viewed Jan. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Greenfield Report Card]. To put the dismal state of 
education in America into perspective, only 2% of the eighth graders at C.O. Greenfield 
Middle School, located within the Roosevelt School District, passed the mathematics por-
tion of Arizona's state assessment exam in 2003. Id. This figure is up from 0% in both 2001 
and 2002. Id. 
4 See Haki R. Madhubuti, A.ll Toices Matter: Artists, Intellectuals, Students and War, BLACK 
ISSUES IN HIGHER EDuc., May 22, 2003, at 36 (noting that the "most critical learning pe-
riod for all children is between birth and 6 years old," and arguing that education is "vital 
for an informed citizenry [because al full citizen is an informed and involved citizen"). 
5 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
6 See Greenfield Report Card, supra note 3; see also AllIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAN 
THERNSTROM, No EXCUSES: CLOSING THE RACIAL GAP IN LEARNING 12, 14, 15, 124, 125 
(2003). The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a test initiated by Con-
gress in 1969 and administered to a representative sample of students nationwide in vari-
ous grades, divides students into four categories. Id. The lowest achieving of these catego-
ries, labeled "Below Basic," is "for students unable to display even 'partial mastery of 
prerequisite knowledge and skills that are fundamental for proficient work' at their grade." 
Id. To be sure, white and Asian students' NAEP results are not particularly laudable. !d. Yet 
the performance of black students, particularly those attending city schools, is abysmal. Id. 
For instance, three out of four black students rank in the "Below Basic" category for sci-
ence and seven out of ten rank "Below Basic" on the mathematics portion of the NAEP. Id. 
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ute7 means that schoolchildren in places like South Phoenix have lit-
tle hope of becoming well educated.s 
This Note argues that in light of the bold, new substantive due 
process architecture announced in Lawrence v. Texas,9 the schoolchil-
dren living in grossly underperforming school districts may in fact 
have a federal constitutional remedy under the Due Process Clause. IO 
Lawrence represents a sea change in the Court's substantive due proc-
ess analysis, and as a result, decisions such as San Antonio Independent 
School Distlict v. Rodligllez are no longer on firm footing. ll When abys-
7 See Diana Jean Schemo, Kennedy Demands Full Funding for School Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
7, 2004, at A18. The Bush administration's foray into education, the No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) Act, raised federal funding 42% in "high-poverty schools" but, as critics of the 
legislation maintain, there is a wide disparity between what the administration can author-
ize under the Act and what the administration actually has budgeted. Id. Senator Edward 
Kennedy argues that President Bush must have "misstated, misspoke, misrepresented his 
position" on the financing of the NCLB Act, because the 42% was much lower than Presi-
dent Bush initially suggested. Id. 
S Sec Brent Staples, Schools Fail Children, Not the Other Way ll.round, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
2004, at A22 (pointing out that it is not that the children are failing the schools, but that 
"the schools are failing the children"). In response to New York City Mayor Bloomberg'S 
proposal to hold back all students who fail third grade, Staples argues for the academic 
equivalent of the "Marshall Plan," in which the city brings in "new principals, teachers, a 
proven new curriculum and smaller classes in the early grades." Id. 
9539 U.S. 558 (2003) . Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence provides a perceptive analysis 
of the majority's reasoning. Id. at 586-605 (Scalia,]., dissenting). This Note often refers to 
his dissent to shed light on the majority's methodology in Lawrence. 
]0 See Wilson Huhn, The Jurisp11ldential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter 
and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.]. 65, 65-66 (2003) (arguing that the "opinions 
of the Supreme Court in both Lawrence and Grutter work fundamental changes in the in-
terpretation of our fundamental rights of liberty and equality"). 
II 411 U.S. 1,6-7 (1973) (reasoning that there is no implicit or explicit fundamental 
right to an education in the Constitution). There exist other constitutional arguments 
worthy of consideration in the effort to overturn Rodriguez, but the breadth of these argu-
ments does not allow for thorough evaluation here. There is, for example, a wealth of 
scholarship on Equal Protection, Free Speech, and Privileges and Immunities Clause chal-
lenges to Rodriguez. See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education 
Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 550, 596, 606 (1992). But see John Dayton, When All Else Has Failed: Resolving the School 
Funding Problem, 1995 B.Y.U. EDuc. & LJ. 1, 19, 20 (opposing constitutional remedies for 
improving public education). 
Another major decision of the 2003 term, G11ltter v. Bollinger; 539 U.S. 306 (2003), sug-
gests that an Equal Protection Clause challenge to Rodrigucz may have new life. The Court in 
Grutier revamped its strict scrutiny and rational basis tests for disputes under the Equal Pro-
tection clause. See id. Professor 'Nilson Huhn comments on this novel approach, inlplying 
that the Court's entire equal protection jurisprudence may now stand on unstable ground: 
Justice O'Connor's deferential mode of strict scrutiny in G11ltter is not the 
only modification that she makes to traditional standards of review. In her 
concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor stated that rational basis 
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mally performing schools fail to provide a baseline level of education, 
Lawrence implies that the students in these schools may have a limited 
constitutional remedy via the Due Process Clause.12 
In Laumm.ce, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas state law that 
prohibited consensual homosexual activity between adults. 13 Admit-
tedly, the holding in Laun'ence has nothing to do with education, but the 
manner in which the Court reached its result has tremendous implica-
tions for the Court's future approach to Due Process Clause challenges. 
Lawrence, as some commentators have already noted, represents the 
ascension of Justice Kennedy's school of substantive due process.14 Not 
only did the majority in Lawrence radically depart from the accepted 
norms of substantive due process jurisprudence, a departure noted be-
low, but they were receptive to protecting interests related to an 
"autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, [and] ex-
analysis is also contextual, noting that in certain cases the Court has applied 
"a more searching version of rational basis." In particular, she reasoned that 
laws that exhibit a desire to harm politically unpopular groups, laws that ex-
press moral disapproval of particular groups, and laws that inhibit personal 
relationships are scrutinized more strictly than laws that do not .... The 
adoption of "higher order rational basis" and "lower order strict scrutiny" es-
sentially signals acceptance of the "sliding scale" equal protection standard 
advocated by Justice John Paul Stevens in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. 
Huhn, supra note 10, at 96-97 (citations omitted). 
12 One thorny issue among legal education scholars is how exactly to define the educa-
tionalliberty interest safeguarded by the Due Process Clause. See Michael Heise, The Courts, 
Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 CORNELL].L. & PUB. POL'y 633, 647-49 
(2002). Professor Michael Heise notes the move from "equity," a claim that schools within 
a state should receive comparable funding, to "adequacy," a claim that schools should re-
ceive the funding necessary to achieve somewhat comparable educational results. Id. at 
647. Considering that Rodriguez. was principally cast in the "equality" framework, an "ade-
quacy" assertion may be more likely to succeed. See id. This Note restricts the scope of the 
"adequacy" approach and suggests that only the educationally moribund or grossly under-
performing schools should be entitled to constitutional relief under the Due Process 
Clause. To put the fiscal magnitude of this issue into perspective, one observer notes that 
the cost alone of restoring school facilities to an adequate level would be $111.1 billion. See 
Kristen Safier, Note, The Question of a Fundamental Right to a Minimally A.dequate Education, 
69 U. CIN. L. REV. 993, 993 (2001). 
13 539 U.S. at 578-79. 
14 See id. Professor Huhn contends that "prior to Lawrence, one wing of the Supreme 
Court believed that the 'right to privacy' is circumscribed by tradition, while the other recog-
nized a general right to make 'personal and intimate choices' that are 'central to personal 
dignity and autonomy.'" Huhn, supra note 10, at 73. It should be noted from the outset that 
Justice O'Connor did not join the Kennedy majority in Lawrence, electing instead to nullify 
the Texas sodomy statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
579-85. Justice O'Connor may eventually subscribe to Lawrence's architecture, given her con-
curring opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D. See491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor,]., concur-
ring) (rejecting Justice Scalia's substantive due process analysis). 
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pression .... "15 For purposes of this Note, three lodestars in Lawrence 
highlight the Court's potential willingness to reconsider Rndriguez. 
First, the Court in Lawrence utilized a surprising form of scrutiny 
in which the majority neither enumerated a "fundamental right" nor 
explicidy employed the heightened form of scrutiny associated with a 
"fundamental right."16 Conservative commentators decry this collaps-
ing scrutiny as nothing less than a consequentialist approachP Re-
sults oriented or not, the Kennedy school of substantive due process 
in Lawnmce has certainly tinkered with the doctrinal, three-tiered lev-
els of scrutiny. IS Second, a majority of the Court looked to foreign ju-
dicial authority in deciding whether a non-fundamental "liberty inter-
est" should survive scrutiny.19 By invoking international case law in its 
decisionmaking, the Kennedy majority signaled that the Supreme 
Court is open to a more global view of the law.20 International author-
ity, particularly decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, favor granting a consti-
tutional liberty interest in a minimally adequate education.21 Third, 
the Court in Laurrence expressed a willingness to shed the cloak of 
15 Lawrence, 539 U,S, at 574-76. One scholar labeled this radical departure a "flawed 
performance." Kevin F. Ryan, A Flawed Performance, 29 VT. BJ. 5, 6 (2003). According to 
the Kevin Ryan, "The Court-or at least Justice Kennedy-has chosen to build jurispru-
dential castles on the most shifting of sands, if not on thin air." Id. Ryan's disdain for Jus-
tice Kennedy's methodology borders on the vitriolic. Id. at 7. He argues that, "To the 
mindlessly liberal, the product of our overly therapeutic and new age times, talk of con-
cepts of existence and the mystery of life evoke positive, oozy feelings-but it does not 
provoke thought." Id. 
16 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586-87 (Scalia,]., dissenting); see Huhn, supra note 10, at 112 
(arguing that in Lawrence the Court demonstrated how "[s] tandards of review such as strict 
scrutiny and rational basis are not static but are sensitive to context"). 
17 See Ryan, supra note 15, at 9 (reasoning that the Court "has a responsibility to ex-
plain its reasoning" and "should not simply adopt what it takes to be a generally accepted 
view, else it makes itself vulnerable to just these sorts of popUlist and reactionary attacks"). 
18Justice Scalia believes the "sweet-mystery-of-life paragraph" in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), included by the m~ority in Lawre1lce, is nothing short of 
results-oriented activism. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587-89 (Scali,,]., dissenting). According to 
Justice Scali" this line of reasoning "ate the rule oflaw." Id. at 588 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
19 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-78. 
2Q See id. Justice Scali, responds that such views are simply "meaningless: even 
"[d]angerous," because the Supreme Court "'should not impose foreign moods, fads or 
fashions'" in its decisions. Id. at 598 (Scalia,]., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 
U.S. 990 n. (2002) (Thomas,]., concurring in deni,l of cert.». 
21 See, e.g., CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, art. 14, 2000 
OJ. (C 364) I,ll [hereinafter CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS]; Case Relating to Cer-
tain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages In Educ. in Belgium (Belgian Linguis-
tics) 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3,25,66 (1968). 
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stare decisis, a startling turnaround after Casey.22 Given the Court's 
revamped approach to stare decisis, the Court may modifY the rigid 
holding of Rodriguez, if students were to bring a claim based on their 
liberty interest in a minimally adequate education.23 
Part I of this Note highlights the dire need for a federal remedy 
to the alarming lack of education students receive in places like South 
Phoenix. Part II focuses on the Rodliguez decision itself, explaining 
the factual and legal principles at work in the decision. Part III looks 
to the Court's ruling in LawJ'ence and the effects of this decision on 
substantive due process methodology, emphasizing the three pillars of 
the decision. Part IV argues that Lawrence's three pillars effectively up-
root the legal premises underlying the Court's decision in Rodliguez. 
Each part concludes with some of the practical difficulties in a post-
Lawrence world, cautioning that there are still aspects of La1l!rence that 
should trouble proponents of a liberty interest in a minimally ade-
quate education. Nevertheless, for the children of destitute school 
districts of America, Lawrence brings a hope unseen for thirty years. 
I. UNDER THE BASELINE OF MINIMALLY ADEQUATE: THE CASE OF 
SOUTH PHOENIX'S C.O. GREENFIELD MIDDLE SCHOOL 
A survey of America's public schools presents some rather trou-
bling statistics: a third of the students who begin high school fail to 
graduate, Latinos are four times less likely and blacks two times less 
likely than whites to graduate from high school, and over ten thou-
sand schools have been identified as "needing improvement" under 
the No Child Left Behind ACt. 24 A closer look at low-income school 
districts in America presents an even more sobering view of our "non-
system system": when students in low-income school districts reach the 
age of nine, they are typically three grade levels behind those students 
in higher-income school districts in both reading and mathematics.25 
22 Casey begins with an emphatic call to follow stare decisis, stating, "Liberty finds no 
refuge in the jurisprudence of doubt." See 505 U.S. at 833. Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence 
dissent, rebuffs the m~ority's approach to stare decisis as confusing consequentialism. See 
539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia,]., dissenting). When "stare decisis meant preservation of judicially 
invented abortion rights," stare decisis binds the Court, yet when unpopular positions are 
at issue, it does not. ld. (Scali.'!,]., dissenting). 
23 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-79; see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59. 
24 Confirmation of Margaret Spellings: Hearing Before Comlll. on Health, Educ., Labor and 
Pensions COllllll., 108th Congo (jan. 6, 2005) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, Member, 
Sen. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions). 
25 See ThERNSTROM & TUERNSTROM, supra note 6, at 12, 14, 15, 124, 125; Who We Are, 
TEACH FOR AMERICA, at http://teachforamerica.org/about.html# (last visited Jan. 15, 
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By looking at one such school-C.O. Greenfield Middle School in 
South Phoenix, Arizona-situated in a low-income school district, the 
education crisis taking place in America's worst schools comes more 
sharply into focus.26 
In Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 v. Bishop (Roosevelt Ele-
mentary), the Arizona Supreme Court declared that the state financing 
scheme for public education violated the state constitutional require-
ment to provide a general and uniform public school system.27 Follow-
ing Roosevelt Elementary, no one expected underperforming schools 
such as C.O. Greenfield Middle School, infused with greater monetary 
resources, to transform overnight into the academic powerhouses of 
neighboring Scottsdale and Paradise Valley.28 Yet, ten years after the 
decision, the optimism shared by many in the wake of Roosevelt Elemen-
tary is now gone.29 The plight of the schoolchildren remains just as 
pronounced as it was in 1994.30 Moreover, the current Arizona legisla-
ture remains just as ambivalent about changing the distribution of edu-
cational resources as it was prior to Roosevelt Elementaly.31 
Some commentators suggest that education reform is subject to 
the same critique as Russian-penned novels: "It goes on forever, and 
2005) (noting that "[c]hildren growing up in low-income communities are seven times less 
likely to graduate from college than children in high-income areas"). 
26 See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 6, at 12. 
27 ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; Roosevelt Elementa.ry Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 
806,808 (Ariz. 1994). 
28 See Roosevelt Elementary, 877 P.2d at 808. Scottsdale's Desert Shadows Middle School and 
Paradise Valley's Mountainside Middle School exemplify the academic success found in 
Phoenix's neighboring communities. Desert Siullunos Middle School: Arizona Sclwol Report Card 
2003-04 (Desert Shadows Report Card), Ariz. Dep't of Educ. 2004, available at 
http://www.ade.az.gov/srcs/ReportCards/50992004.pdf; Mountainside Middle School: Arizona 
School Report Card 2003-04 (Mountainside Report Card), Ariz. Dep't of Educ. 2004, available at 
http://www.ade.az.gov/srcs/ReportCards/50632004.pdf. The Arizona Department of Educa-
tion consistently ranks the "elementary achievement profile" of each school as "excelling." 
Desert Shadow Report Card, sttpra; Mountainside Report Card, supra. Eighty-four percent of Desert 
Shadow students achieved one year's academic growth during their eighth grade year. Desert 
Shadow, supra, at 3. The numbers at Mount."linside Middle School are even higher, with 86% 
of eighth graders achieving one year's growth. Moulltainside Report Card, supra, at 3. 
29 See, e.g. Editorial, Unequal Education, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, July 23, 1994, at 20A (argu-
ing that after Roosevelt Elementary, "everybody wins long term" when schoolchildren receive 
equal resources because an equit."lble distribution helps stop "the cycle of poverty"). 
30 Only 1 % of C.O. Greenfield's fifth grade mathematics students passed the state as-
sessment, the AIMS test, in 2003; this figure is down from 2% in 2002. Greenfield Report 
Card, supra note 3. 
31 See Roosevelt Elementary, 877 P.2d at 806. In addressing the current budget woes, the 
Arizona Legislature has not ruled out scaling back education funding for the next fiscal 
year. Anne Ryman, Schools Examine Finances; Scottsdale Expects $1 Million Deficit, ARIZ. RE-
PUBLIC, Nov. 3, 2003, at 1. 
350 Boston College Third World Law lou rnal [Vol. 25:343 
in the end, everyone dies. "32 In the Roosevelt School District, children 
actually are dying; asthma rates are the highest in Phoenix and 
schools are too financially strapped to combat the problem.33 To illus-
trate further the disparate distribution of educational resources in the 
Phoenix metropolitan area, one need only look to Baseline Road, 
linking South Phoenix to Mesa. Along Baseline Road are two public 
schools: C.O. Greenfield Middle School in the Roosevelt School Dis-
trict, and RhodesJunior High School in the Mesa Unified District.34 
Rife with escalating unemployment and beset with a migratory 
population, only 1 % of Greenfield's fifth grade student body met Ari-
zona's educational competency exams-the Arizona Instrument to 
Measure Standards, or AIMS-standards in mathematics.35 Only 2% 
of the eighth grade student body met or exceeded AIMS standards in 
math.36 Rates on the same eighth grade exam at Rhodes Junior High, 
located in a wealthy suburb, were 33%, a figure 12% higher than the 
state average for eighth grade math.37 The Greenfield scores on the 
Stanford 9, a nationally administered standardized test, confirm these 
abysmal results-students in the fifth and eighth grade consistently 
ranked in the bottom 5% of students taking the exam.38 Students at 
Rhodes, on the other hand, ranked in the upper 25%.39 Few think 
Greenfield is improving and yet schools such as the neighboring 
Rhodes continue to thrive. 40 
32 Paul Zielbauer, The Courts Try to Get City Schools Their Fair Share, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2001, § 3 (Magazine), at 3. 
33 Karina Bland, A.sthma Robs Childhoods, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 25, 2001, at AIO (reason-
ing that schools in South Phoenix have higher rates of children hospitalized with asthma 
than anywhere else in the Phoenix area). 
34 In the Roosevelt School District, "51 percent of the teachers are either non-tenured 
or substitutes." Beverly Medlyn, Schools Gasping/or Teachers, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 8, 2001, at 
Bl. To put this high number in perspective, a recent study by Education Week found that 
students of certified teachers, as opposed to uncertified teachers, attained at least two 
months improvement on grade equivalency scales over the course of one year, equivalent 
to 20% in terms of overall academic growth. Maggie Galehouse, National Report Grades 
A.rizona Teachers Poorly, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 8, 2003, at B3. 
35 See Greenfield Report Card, supra note 3, at 6. 
36Id. Ten schools in the Roosevelt School District, including Greenfield, failed to meet 
federal learning goals, known as Adequate Yearly Progress (AW). Schools That Fall Below 
Federal Standards, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 2003, at B4. 
37 Rhodes junior High Scho04 GREATSCHooLs.m:T, at http://www.greatschools.net/cgi-
bin/az/districcprofile/1133 (last updated Sept. 2004) [hereinafter Rhodesjunior High). 
38 Greenfield Report Card, supra note 3, at 8. 
39 Rhodesjunior High, supra note 37. 
40 See Rhodesju11 ior High, supra note 37. Granted that the state average on the AIMS for 
eighth grade math was an unspectacular 21 % in 2003, Greenfield had no student pass the 
exam in either 2001 or 2002. Greenfield Report Card, supra note 3, at 6. 
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With a demographic significantly composed of aging, wealthy 
retirees who steadfastly vote against state tax increases for education 
and vote out legislators who support such measures, Arizona's fund-
ing of education is not likely to change through the democratic proc-
ess.41 Moreover, in Roosevelt Elementary, the Arizona Supreme Court 
emphasized that the state constitution does not require perfect equal-
ity and that disparities that "are not the result of the state's own 
financing scheme do not implicate the interests sought to be served 
by art. XI, §1. "42 It is not surprising that Arizona currently ranks sec-
ond to last in education spending per student in Arnerica43 and thirty-
third on the wealth neutrality scale.44 
Though currently locally run, some within the Roosevelt School 
District would prefer the state to takeover their failing schools.45 In 
light of stalled legislative initiatives and the Arizona Supreme Court's 
reluctance to achieve financial equity, it is unlikely that a state take-
over would improve these children's prospects.46 The state legislature 
repeatedly demands that underperforming school districts meet stan-
dards, yet does not provide the necessary resources to achieve desired 
results.47 The federal government could help these flagging schools, 
but if the most recent federal foray into education is any indication, 
that help may not be forthcoming. 48 In his 1973 Rodriguez. dissen t, Jus-
tice Marshall stated, "[C]ountless children unjustifiably receive infe-
rior educations that 'may affect their hearts and minds in a way un-
41 See Chris Fiscus & Mel Melendez, Education Bills Floodillg Legislature, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Feb. 13, 2003, at BI. A recent initiative put forward by the current Superintendent of Pub-
lic Instruction, Tom Horne, would further reduce state spending on education, shifting 
funding to local school districts. ld. Critics maintain that hiking local taxes will hurt poor 
school districts. ld. 
42 Roosevelt Elementary, 877 P.2d 806, 816 (Ariz. 1994). Chief Justice Feldman, con-
curring in the judgment, would ha\'e resolved the funding disparity issue by appealing to 
the state's equal protection clause. ld. at 818 (Feldman, Cl, concurring). He went further 
than the m;yority by concluding that "the equal protection clause prevents a state from 
making the quality of a child's basic educational opportunity a function of the wealth of 
the district in which the pupil resides." ld. (Feldman, Cl, concurring). 
43 Ronald A. Skinner, State Report Cards, Enuc. WEEK, Jan. 8, 2004, at 124. 
441d. 
45 Betty Reid, Roosevelt Officials Challging View 011 State Solutions Teams, ARIZ. REpUBLIC, 
Feb. 18,2004,atI6. 
46 See id. 
47 See Fiscus & Melendez, supra note 41. 
48 Pat Kossan, U.S. Education Law to Cost State $108 Million, ARIZ. REpUBLIC, Aug. 10, 
2003, at AI. The members of the Arizona legislature and Arizona Supreme Court are not 
the only responsible parties. See id. Federally required tests under NCLB will cost Arizona 
$108 million, with the federal govemment picking up less than half the cost. ld. 
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likely ever to be undone. "'49 More than thirty years after Rodriguez, 
there remain countless children toiling in America's worst schools-
schools such as C.O. Greenfield Middle School in South Phoenix-
whose plight deserves some immediate remedy.50 
II. INTRODUCTION TO RODRIGUEZ 
Arriving at a constitutional remedy for the crisis in America's 
worst schools requires an exposition of the factual and legal principles 
underlying Rodliguez, the towering precedent in the debate over the 
federal right to education.51 The plaintiffs in Rodriguez were the 
schoolchildren of the low-income Edgewood Independent School 
District, possessing a minority population of over 96%, 90% of whom 
were Mexican-American and over 6% of whom were black.52 In con-
trast to the nearby Alamo Heights Independent School District, whose 
equalized local tax rate yielded $356 per student, the tax rate in 
Edgewood yielded only $26 for the education of each child. 53 The de-
fendants in the Rodriguez class action consisted of the State Board of 
Education, the Commissioner of Education, the Attorney General, 
and the Bexar County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees.54 The plain-
tiffs relied on a two-prong Equal Protection Clause challenge.55 Either 
education was a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause 
that the Texas system of education finance violated without a compel-
ling purpose, or the education-financing scheme disadvantaged a sus-
pect class without a compelling governmental purpose.56 Significantly, 
49 411 U.S. at 71-72 (Marshall,]., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 494 (1954». 
50 Seeid. at 7-17. 
51 In its substantive due process decisions, the Court has recognized numerous fun-
damental rights as safeguarded by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (reasoning that state law pro-
hibiting interracial marriage violates right to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (reasoning that state law prohibiting sale of contraceptives violates right to pri-
vacy); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (reasoning that state law prohibiting 
parochial education violates parents' right to control upbringing of their children). 
52 411 U.S. at 12. 
53Id. 
54 Id. at 5 n.2. In an interesting turn of events, the class action first brought suit against 
the San Antonio Independent School District (SAISD) as well, but the trial judge dis-
missed SAISD. Id. SAISD later joined the plaintiffs' side, even filing an amicus brief on 
behalf of the schoolchildren of Englewood. Id. 
55 Id. at 18. 
56Id. 
2005] Non-Fundamental Liberty Interest in Adequate Education 353 
however, the plaintiffs did not put forward a substantive due process 
challenge to the Texas financing scheme.57 
The plaintiffs in Rodliguez emphasized three previous decisions in 
which the Court spoke of education as immensely important, even 
fundamental to the function of society.58 Meyer v. Nebraska invalidated 
a Nebraska law that had prohibited the teaching of German because it 
violated the cardinal right of parents to decide children's upbringing 
and schooling.59 Likewise, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court struck 
down a state law that prohibited attendance at parochial school as a 
violation of the right of parents to choose their child's education.60 
Perhaps most famously, Brown v. Board of Education put an end to state-
authorized segregation of school districts and recognized that "educa-
tion is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments."61 The Court in Rodligllez, however, distinguished constitu-
tionally fundamental from socially fundamental, explaining that 
education was a socially fundamental right and that the legislative 
branch therefore holds dominion over it. 62 
The plaintiffs in Rodligllez could not convince the Court that the 
fundamental right to education is a necessary precondition for other 
rights, such as the right to vote or the right of free speech.63 The "un-
57 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18. 
58 See id. at 29-30; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Pierce v. Soc'y of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer \'. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). 
59 262 U.S. at 403. 
60 268 U.S. at 535. 
61 347 U.S. at 493. 
62 See 411 U.S. at 30-31, 33-34. The Court invoked Justice Harlan's cautionary \'iew of 
fundamental rights, stating that: 
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict scrutiny to 
a law impinging upon the right of interstate travel, admonished that 
"[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights." ... [I]f the degree of 
judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated, depending on a m~ority's view 
of the importance of the interest affected, we would have gone "far toward 
making this court a 'super-legislature.'" 
ld. at 30-31 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655, 661 (1969». 
63 ld. at 35-36, 37-38. Justice Brennan in dissent took issue with the m~ority's nar-
rowed definition of "fundamentality." ld. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan contends that fundamentality "is, in large measure, a function of the right's impor-
tance in terms of the effectuation of those rights which are in fact constitutionally 
guaranteed." /d. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For more on education as a precondition of 
other rights, see Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a Fundamental Right: ChalZcnging the 
Supreme Court's Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953, 995-96 (1998) (reasoning that the 
Rodriguez Court undervalued the "disparaging effects" on the right to vote, demonstrating 
that "the level of participation in Ollr electoral democracy is lower among poor urban 
populations ... compared to others"); Peter S. Smith, Note, il.ddressing the Plight of lllneT-
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held holding" of Rodriguez is that there may be an implicit right to 
"some identifiable quantum of education" within the Constitution.64 
Yet this quantum must be an amount of education just short of abso-
lute deprivation because the Rodriguez Court did not consider a right 
to a baseline level of education from plaintiffs' facts. 65 In sum, the 
Court was not convinced that Texas financing system denied children 
"an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the 
enjoyment" of Constitutional rights. 66 
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Rodriguez, rejected as 
"simplistic" the district court's finding that wealth is a suspect 
classification for purposes of Equal Protection Clause challenges.67 He 
wrote: 
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks this 
Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system 
that allegedly discriminates a large, diverse, and amorphous 
class, unified only by the common factor of residents in dis-
tricts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other dis-
tricts.68 
City Schools: The Federal Right to Education After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 18 
WHITHER L. REV. 825, 862 (1997) (arguing that states must, at a minimum ensure educa-
tional adequacy so that "children can escape the degradation of poverty" and participate in 
the "country's economic and political life"). But see Gregory Maggs, Innovation in Constitu-
tional Law: The Right to Education and the Tricks of the Trade, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038, 1052 
(1992) (arguing that the ratifiers of the First Amendment might never have intended that 
free speech require an adequate education). 
64 411 U.S. at 36; Bitensky, supra note 11, at 595. 
65 411 U.S. at 36. 
66 Id. at 37. According to Justice Powell, the Court would have to guarantee every per-
son adequate housing, clothing, and sustenance, because such necessities are the most 
basic preconditions for the enjoyment of constitutional rights. Id. 
67 Id. at 28. Some commentators have noted, unlike the Court in Rodriguez, that "poor 
districts may tax property at an even higher rate than the wealthy districts, yet generate less 
revenue." Avidan Y Cover, Is ''A.dequacy'' a More "Political Question" Than "Equality ?": The 
Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL'y 403,404 (2002). 
68 Rodriguez., 411 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added). In his dissent, Justice Marshall looks to 
the racial segregation cases as standing for the principle that the invidiousness of segre-
gated public institutions was not solely on the basis of race, but also on the basis of wealth. 
Id. at 84-85 (Marshall,]., dissenting).Justice Marshall writes: 
In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for spe-
cialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law re-
view and similar activities, the [whites only] Law School is superior ... It is 
difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools 
would consider the question close. 
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Justice Powell's critique was that such a classification lacks a "definitive 
description" of what separates an individual in the "poor" class as op-
posed to another class, and that such an amorphous classification 
does not result in the total deprivation of education for this class.69 As 
a result, the financing scheme for the state of Texas fell into the type 
of social and economic legislation subject to the most deferential level 
of scrutiny-rational basis.70 Not surprisingly, the scheme "abun-
dantly" satisfied this minimal level of scrutiny.71 Local control, or the 
principle that local taxpayers should determine the amoun t of fund-
ing for government programs, represented a satisfactory basis for 
maintaining the school-funding scheme for the state of Texas.72 
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE THREE PILLARS OF LA WRENCE 
Based upon the reasoning of Lawrence, the Supreme Court seems 
poised to revisit Rodligllez. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court overruled 
Bowen v. Hardwick, a seventeen-year-old decision in which the Court 
chose not to confer "the fundamental right upon homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy."73 The Court noted the factual similarities between 
the two cases, but recognized that the Georgia law at issue in Bowen 
applied to both same-sex and heterosexual sodomy, whereas the Texas 
law at issue in Lawrence only applied to same-sex sodomy.74 In the ma-
Id. (Marshall,]., dissenting) (citing Sweatt v. Pain ter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950)). 
69 Id. at 19. One recent analysis contends that a "more discretely defined plaintiff class 
would have avoided the Court's admonishment in Rodrigllez" and potentially may have 
saved the suspect classification. David V. Abbott & Stephen M. Robinson, School Finance 
Litigation: The Viability of Bringing Suit ill the Rhode Island Federal District Court, 5 ROGER 'VIL-
LIAMS U.L. REV. 441, 450 (2000). 
70 Rodrigllez, 411 U.S. at 55. 
71 Id. In Justice \Vhite's dissent, he, like the majority, subjected the Texas financing 
scheme to rational basis scrutiny, but was uncOlwinced about Texas' purported goal of 
local decisionmaking. Id. at 68-70 (vVhite,]., dissenting). In a more searching form of 
rational basis scrutiny, Justice VVhite concluded, "[I] n the present case we would blink 
reality to ignore the fact that school districts, and students in the end, are differentially 
affected by the Texas school-financing scheme .... " Id. at 70. But sec Frank]. Macchiarola 
& Joseph G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts: The A.ftermath of San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez i1l the State Courts, 30 VAL. U.L. REV. 551, 580 (1996) (reasoning that a 
"return to local control and a greater freedom to experiment with alternatiYe forms of 
schooling appear to be working," and that the judiciary should not undervalue local con-
trol as a legitimate governmental interest). 
7~ Rodligllez, 411 U.S. at 54. 
73 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-79; Bowers v. Hardv.ick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). 
i4 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566. This distinction generated Justice O'Connor's concurring 
opinion, which decided Lawrence based on the Equal Protection Clause Id. at 579-81,585 
(O'Connor,]., concurring). She believed that the "Texas statute makes homosexuals une-
qual in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct-and only that conduct-subject 
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jority opmIOn delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court expressly re-
buffed the Bowers decision, declaring that it "ought not to remain 
binding precedent" and "now is overruled."75 Although wielding the 
sword of substantive due process, however, the Court never explicitly 
recognized a fundamental right in Lawrence.76 
Unlike some aspects of Justice Kennedy's opinion, the facts and 
procedural history of Lawrence are straightforward.77 Houston police 
responded to a reported domestic disturbance at one defendant's 
home and found the defendants engaged in a private, consensual ho-
mosexual act.78 The Harris County Police Department charged and the 
Harris County Criminal Court convicted the defendants with violating a 
prohibition on same-sex "deviate sexual intercourse."79 The defendants 
to criminal sanction." ld. at 581 (O'Connor,]., concurring). Her analysis reflects an align-
ment closer with the Kennedy-led m.yority, because Justice O'Connor institutes an en-
hanced rational basis test in which "[mJoral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate 
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause." ld. at 583 (O'Connor,]., con-
curring). Justice O'Connor did not comment on the substantive due process challenge 
sufficiently to divine her current view of the law, stating: 
Whether a sodomy law that is neutral both in effect and application ... would 
violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is an issue that 
need not be decided today. I am confident, however, that so long as the Equal 
Protection Clause requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the private con-
sensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, such a law would 
not long stand in our democratic society. 
ld. at 584-85 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
75 ld. at 578. 
76 See id. at 586 (Scalia,]., dissenting). In his dissent,Justice Scalia writes: 
Though there is discussion of "fundamental proposition [sJ" ... and "funda-
mental decisions," ... nowhere does the Court's opinion declare that homo-
sexual sodomy is a "fundamental right" under the Due Process clause; nor 
does it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be appro-
priate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a "fundamental right." 
Thus, while overruling the outcome of Bowers, the Court leaves strangely un-
touched its central legal conclusion .... Instead the Court simply describes 
petitioner's conduct as "an exercise of their Iiberty"-which it undoubtedly 
is-and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that 
will have far-reaching implications beyond this case. 
ld. (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
77 ld. at 562-63. 
78 ld. 
79 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (1993); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563-64. The statute 
read, "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with an-
other individual of the same sex." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a). Deviate sexual inter-
course is defined as: "(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and 
the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of 
another person with an object." ld. § 21.01 (1) (a)-(b). 
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challenged the statute as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the Texas Constitution's own equal protection 
clause.8o Relying on Bowers, the controlling federal case, the Texas ap-
peals court rejected defendants' federal claims and affirmed the trial 
court's ruling on the constitutionality of Texas' deviate sexual inter-
course prohibition.8! In deciding the merits of the Due Process Clause 
challenge, the Court in Lawrence used three different tools in its sub-
stantive due process analysis: a malleable form of minimal scrutiny, an 
appeal to international case law, and a new stare decisis test.82 
A. Inscrutable Scrutiny and Fundamentally Not Fundamental: The 
Intriguing Level oj Review in Lawrence 
If Bowers held that homosexuals did not have the fundamental 
right to engage in same-sex intercourse, one might presume an "over-
turning" of Bowers would logically necessitate the declaration of a fun-
damental right.83 Instead, the Court provided a nebulous description 
of what Lawrence decided: 
[I]ndividual decisions by married [or unmarried] persons, 
concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even 
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of "lib-
erty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.84 
80 Lawrence, 539 u.s. at 563--64. 
81 Id. 
82 Sec geneml£y id. 
83 Sec id. at 586-87 (Scalia,]., dissenting); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
84 539 U.S. at 578. The Court in Lawrence essentially decided that Justice Stevens's dis-
senting opinion in Bowers now controls. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
Melanie Falco argues that the Court could have more appropriately decided Lawrence un-
der the Eighth Amendment. Melanie C. Falco, The Road Not Taken: Using the Eighth ilmend-
ment to Strike Down Criminal Punishment jar Engaging ill Consensual Sexual Acts, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 723, 758 (2004) (reasoning that the Eighth Amendment "provides a viable alternative 
framework for challenging punishment ... in light of the problems with the due process 
and equal protection analyses presented"). Falco fails to consider the gain netted by the 
gay and lesbian community by the Court's ruling in Lawrence, because Lawrence, rendered 
under the flexible Due Process Clause, can be a decision that the Court will revisit and 
possibly enlarge to encompass other legislation having only "public morality" as its basis. 
Sec id. 
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To complicate matters, the Court added that public morality is "not a 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting [a] practice" tradi-
tionally viewed as immoral.85 
Justice Scalia's dissent argued that the Law-ence majority must have 
adopted rational basis review, but Justice Kennedy never revealed which 
level of scrutiny failed his substantive due process analysis.86 Public mo-
rality, the Court implied, is an unconvincing justification for intrusive 
government action no matter the level of scrutiny-rational basis, in-
termediate or strict-employed.87 As a result, Law-ence does not fit 
cleanly into the Court's prior substantive due process jurisprudence, 
because the decision neither recognizes a single fundamental right nor 
articulates which level of scrutiny the Court imposed.88 Perhaps the 
Court in Lawrence collapsed the treasured three tiers of scrutiny and 
replaced it with a "sliding scale" approach.89 As Judge Posner recently 
noted, 'We should follow what the Supreme Court does and not just 
what it says it is doing. The Court rejects a 'sliding scale' approach to 
equal protection in words but occasionally accepts it in deeds. "90 
Or perhaps Lawrence recognized a fundamental liberty interest 
for persons of any sexual orientation to engage in consensual intimate 
behavior.91 Maybe the Court applied a form of rational basis scrutiny 
in which the asserted basis for the sodomy statute was not rationally 
related to the non-fundamental liberty interest.92 Perhaps it is best to 
refer to the liberty interest to engage in private, consensual sexual acts 
as having the "stature of a fundamental right,''93 or being a "quasi-
fundamental" right, a term Justice Burger coined in Plyler v. Doe.94 Un-
til another Supreme Court decision clarifies Law-ence, there will be no 
B5 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78. 
86 See id. at 577-79. 
87Id. at 586 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
88 See id. (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
89 See id. (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
90 Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 769 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Posner,]., dissenting), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2816 (2004). 
9) See A. Scott Loveless, Children on the Front Lines of an Ideological War: The Differing Val-
ues of Differing Values, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 371, 396 n.77 (2003) (reasoning that 
"the Supreme Court has elevated private, consensual sodomy from the realm of being 
subject to state regulation to the stature of a fundamental right"). 
92 See Ryan, supra note 15, at 7 (arguing that the Court must have decided that the 
right to engage in sodomy was non-fundamental because it would be "extremely difficult to 
root such a right deeply in our history and tradition"). 
93 See Loveless, supra note 91, at 396. 
94 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
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definitive answer.95 The initial reaction to Lawrence by the lower fed-
eral courts and state courts, however, indicates that judges are just as 
confused as legal scholars are.96 
Since the Lawrence decision, the lower federal courts have de-
scribed the "right" of Lawrence in varied, and sometimes contradictory, 
manners.97 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recognized 
the glaring absence of a "fundamental right" and hints that Justice 
Kennedy's legal analysis was particular to the set of facts in Lawrence.98 
The court in Lo.fto.n v. Secretary o.f Department o.f Children & Family Serv-
ices treated the "right" in Lawrence as the "by-product of several differ-
ent constitutional principles and liberty interests," not carefully de-
scribed and arrived at via rational basis review.99 Other courts refer to 
the "right" in Lawrence as the "individual's liberty interest in the rights 
... to privacy and choice in one's personal and sexual relation-
ships"loO or, in more pragmatic terms, "the right to engage in consen-
sual homosexual activity."lOl 
Similarly, state courts, in deciding issues under state constitu-
tions, stumble over defining the "right" in Lawrence and have difficulty 
articulating how the lack of a fundamental right should fit into future 
95 At least one lower court avoided the right decided in Lawrence by choosing more cir-
cumspect language. In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 520, 524 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (refer-
ring to Law1'Cnce as "finding due process violation in Texas statute prohibiting same-sex 
sodomy," while maintaining that substantive due process is "alive and well in its jurispru-
dence, insofar as it concerns individual rights and liberties"). 
96 Sec, e.g., David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: l'iews of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 333, 
333 n.4 (2003) (citing Lawrence for the proposition that "criminalization of homosexual con-
duct violates due process because adults have fundamental right to autonomy in intimate 
choices"). But sec Erwin Ch emerin sky, Implied Fundamental Rights, 700 PLI/LIT 167, 171 
(2003) (arguing that Lawrellcestands for the "right to private consensual sexual activity"). 
97 Sec, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
(citing Lawrence for the proposition that there is a "right to engage in private consensual 
homosexual conduct"). 
98 Sec Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Sen's., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11 th Cir. 
2004), ccrt. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005) (reasoning that Lawrence "cannot be extrapolated 
to create a righ t to adopt for homosexual persons"). 
99Id. at 817 (reasoning that it would be a "strained and ultimately incorrect reading of 
Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental right"). 
100 Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 871 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (reasoning that Iowa stat-
ute that prohibited a criminal sex offender from living within two thousand feet of a 
school violated the sex offender's fundamental right to family choice, privacy, and inter-
state travel). 
101 Bradley v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 697, 706 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (reason-
ing that the reporting of corruption is not protected by one's right to substantive due pro-
cess) . 
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due process analysis. 102 In Commonwealth v. Mayfield, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania referred to the Lawrence decision as standing 
for the "due process right of consenting adults to engage in private 
sexual conduct free from governmental interference."lo3 A recent Ari-
zona appellate decision on the issue of gay marriage takes a different 
approach. 104 In Standhardt v. Superior Court, the court found that be-
cause "the Court did not consider sexual conduct between same-sex 
partners a fundamental right, it would be illogical to interpret [Law-
rence] as recognizing a fundamental right to enter a same-sex mar-
riage."105 Put another way, the fundamental right analysis after Law-
rence is "one great blooming, buzzing confusion. "106 
B. Justice Without Borders: International Authmity Informing 
Constitutional Liberty Interests 
Justice Kennedy's frequent appeals in Lawrence to international 
authority suggest that the Court is globalizing its substantive due pro-
cess analysis.107 To begin, Justice Kennedy uses in ternational authority 
to undermine Justice Burger's version of history. lOB International 
102 The Kansas Court of Appeals, for example, referred to the right announced in 
Lawrence as a homosexual's "privacy right to be free from the criminalization of homosex-
ual sex." State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 234-35 (Kan. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 
284 (Kan. May 25,2004). The court applied minimal scrutiny to an equal protection and a 
due process challenge of a Kansas law that imposed harsher penalties for same-sex statu-
tory rape than for heterosexual statutory rape. Id. 
103 832 A.2d 418, 425 (Pa. 2003) (reasoning that nonconsensual sexual acts are not 
protected by Lawrence). 
104 Sec Standhardt v. Super. Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 2004 
Ariz. LEXIS 62 (Ariz. May 25, 2004) (reasoning that gay men do not have a fundamental 
righ t to en ter a same-sex marriage). But see Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N .E.2d 
941,968 (Mass. 2003) (ruling that homosexuals have a fundamental right to enter into a 
same-sex marriage). 
105 77 P.3d at 457. 
106 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 488 (1998). Although the state 
and lower federal courts leave the right espoused in Lawrence ill-defined, the courts have in 
fact found limits to this right. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 294 F. Supp. 797, 803 
(D.S.C. 2003) (reasoning that there is no violation of Due Process Clause for conviction 
under the federal child pornography possession laws); State v. Clark, 588 S.E.2d 66, 68-69 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (reasoning that Lawrence does not control alleged violation of Due 
Process Clause since the present case, unlike Lawrence, involved minors). 
107 For a critique of Justice Kennedy's appeal to international case law in Lawrence and 
Justice Ginsburg's appeal to United Nations standards in her concurring opinion in Gmt-
ter, see John Leo, Editorial, What in the World Were the Justices Thinking?, SEATTLE TIMES, July 
15,2003, at B5 (arguing that the U.S. Constitution should not be "adapted to foreign gov-
erning documen ts"). 
lOB Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570-72 (2003), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). Justice Kennedy argued that "scholarship casts some doubt on 
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authority, particularly the British parliament's 1967 repeal of anti-
sodomy statutes and a 2001 decision of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, discredit Burger's overstated belief in the Western Civili-
zation tradition of criminalizing homosexual conduct.109 Later in the 
decision, Justice Kennedy appeals to international case law to show 
that the values of the international community have changed since 
Bowers, and that the Court's due process analysis must be in concert.110 
He discusses three additional decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights that speak to "action consistent with an affirmation of 
the protected right of homosexuals to engage in intimate sexual in-
tercourse" in the forty-five nations of the EU.m 
Each of these decisions is grounded in article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, which, unlike the U.S. Constitution, 
explicitly asserts a right to privacy.1l2 Justice Kennedy takes legal and 
cultural values from jurisdictions with much more expansive constitu-
tional rights and uses these values to inform his substantive due proc-
ess analysis. lI3 If the Court follows this aspect of Lawrence in future 
substantive due process cases, the government must assert that its 
purported justification is "somehow more legitimate or urgent" than 
justifications that have failed previously in international jurisdic-
the sweeping nature of the statement by Chief Justice Burger as it pertains to private ho-
mosexual conduct between consenting adults." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 57l. 
109 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) (1983) (striking down anti-sodomy laws as applied to persons over the age of twenty-
one)). 
110 Id. at 576 (reasoning that, to "the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a 
wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been 
rejected elsewhere"). 
III Id.; see European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. The cases 
include P.G. &J.H. v. United Kingdom, 200l-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195 (reasoning that police 
wiretapping in the defendants' apartment violated article 8 of the European Convention); 
Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (reasoning that a Cypriot statute that 
criminalized homosexual conduct to be a violation of article 8 of the European Com'en-
tion); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (striking down Irish legislation 
that criminalized homosexual acts as violating article 8 of the European Convention). The 
inclusion of P.G. & JH. is interesting because the criminal conviction did not seemingly 
involve a criminalized homosexual act. See generat(v 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195. The sexual 
orient..tion of the two men was never raised in the record. See 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195. 
Il2 See CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 21, art. 8(1), at 10 ("Everyone 
has the right to the protection of personal dat.. concerning him or her."). 
In See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576; Leo, supra note 107 (perceiving Lawrence to be part of 
the "push toward standards out of sync with American traditions of liberty"). 
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tions.114 Put another way, the Court in Lawrence chose not to distin-
guish America from the rest of western civilization.ll5 
The dissent chastises the manner in which the majority plucked 
precedent from international authority} 16 Justice Scalia refers to Jus-
tice Kennedy's appeal to international law as "dangerous dicta, for 
this Court should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on 
Americans."117 In the recently decided Olympic Airways v. Husain, Jus-
tice Scalia rebukes the Court for paradoxically being international on 
some issues, such as the criminalization of homosexual conduct, but 
insular on others.118 He suggests that the Court deems international 
authority "relevant" only when this authority comports with its own 
policy determination.119 The federal courts have taken notice of the 
"English experience and decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights" in cases involving individual liberties.120 As Justice Scalia cor-
rectly argues, however, the Court in Lawrence did more than just take 
notice of foreign authority; it deferred to it.l2l As one commentator 
notes, Lawrence achieves "landmark status" by using international 
authority to define liberty interests under the U.S. Constitution's Due 
Process Clause.122 In this respect, if Lawrence serves as a guide for fu-
ture due process challenges, internationally recognized values may 
114 539 U.S. at 577. 
115 Sce id. 
116 [d. at 599 (Scalia,j., dissenting) (arguing that the "Court's discussion of these for-
eign views [is] meaningless" for substantive due process analysis). 
117 [d. (Scalia,j., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 n. (2002) (Tho-
mas,j., concurring in denial of cert.». 
118 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia,]., dissenting). Referencing Lawnmcc,Justice Scalia 
writes: 
[d. 
Today's decision stands out for its failure to give any serious consideration to 
how [international courts] have resolved the legal issues before us. This sud-
den insularity is striking, since the Court in recent years has canvassed the 
prevailing law in other nations (at least Western European nations) to deter-
mine the meaning of an American Constitution that those nations had no 
part in framing and that those nations' courts have no role in enforcing. 
119 [d. 
120 United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 65-66 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting that 
although "judicial consideration of attitudes in other countries has been criticized," some 
provisions of the Constitution should be evaluated in light of the "English experience"), 
121 See 539 U.S. at 599. 
122 See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Father Knows Best: The Court's Result-Oriented Activism Contin-
ues Apace: Selected Business-Related Decisions from the 2002-2003 Term, 39 ThLSA L. REv. 75, 78 
(2003) (reasoning that the Lawrence Court "ushered in a new authoritative source from 
which to develop and deploy legal argument: the authority of other sovereignties"). 
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help determine whether a non-fundamental liberty interest survives 
this new form of scrutiny}23 
C. Decisis-isis: The Court's Multifactor Test for Relying on Precedent 
Lawrence also broke ground with Justice Kennedy's bold test for 
stare decisis, subjecting the Court's prior substantive due process de-
cisions to a greater possibility of reversal.124 The Lawrence test for stare 
decisis includes the extent that state government has relied upon the 
prior decision, the degree that subsequent decisions have eroded the 
foundations of the prior decision, and amount or pervasiveness of the 
criticism lodged against the prior decision. 125 Since Bowers was the 
guinea pig for this innovative stare decisis test, the Lawrence-Bowers re-
lationship must be regarded as the standard-bearer for future substan-
tive due process analysis. 126 
Although Justice Scalia tries to delineate the three provisions of 
the Lawrence stare decisis test as though they are mutually exclusive, 
the provisions of this multifactor test are interrelated, and as a result, 
must be read together.127 For example, the Court's assessment of the 
detrimental reliance on Bowers takes into account subsequent deci-
sions of the Court.128 The Court looked to two decisions rendered af-
ter the 1985 Bowers decision-Romer v. Evans and Planned Parenthood v. 
123 See Janet Koven Levit, Going Public with Transnational Law: The 2002-2003 Supreme 
Court Term, 39 TuLSA L. REv. 155, 164 (2003) (arguing that "a m;yority of justices sent a 
potent message to foreign constitutional courts that they will engage their foreign col-
leagues in a court-to-court transnational dialogue and will participate in the evolution of a 
'global jurisprudence. '"). 
124 See 539 U.S. at 587 (Scali,,]., dissenting). 
125 [d. (Scali,,]., dissenting). The Court's first prong of the test, "detrimental reliance," 
is something of a redundancy in terms. In keeping with the Court's parlance, this Note 
uses "detrimental reli,nce" similarly, to describe the degree to which state courts rely upon 
a U.S. Supreme Court decision in resolving state constitutional issues. Detrimental reli-
ance, therefore, measures the extent by which the federal precedent served as a guidepost 
for the state's decision. For example, scant detrimental reliance would indicate that the 
state court or state legislature did not rely upon the Supreme Court's decision in interpret-
ing rights under the state constitution. On the other hand, considerable detrimental reli-
ance would signify that the ruling in question played an important role in the state's de-
termination. Justice Scali, argues that this new three-prong test "should surprise no one" 
because the Lawrence analysis of stare decisis "exposed Casey's extraordinary deference to 
precedent for the result-oriented expedient that it is." [d. at 592 (Scali,,]., dissenting). 
126 See id. at 572-79; Vitro v. Mihelcic, 806 N.E.2d 632, 641 (Ill. 2004) (Fitzgerald,]., 
dissenting) (looking in part to LawTCnce for the proposition that "stare decisis is not so static 
a concept that it binds our hands to do justice when we have made a mistake"). 
127 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587-88 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
128 See id. at 570-79. 
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Casey.129 In Romel~ the Court struck down a ratified amendment to the 
Colorado state constitution that would have denied persons of bisex-
ual and homosexual orientation certain privileges, including protec-
tion under state anti-discrimination laws.l3° The LawTence Court also 
cited Casey, a decision that affirmed the fundamental right to an abor-
tion, as standing for the proposition that" [p] ersons in a homosexual 
relationship may seek autonomy ... just as heterosexual persons 
do. "131 According to the Court, the Casey and RomeT opinions advised 
state governments not to rely on the decision in BOWeTS. 132 
Moreover, the Court held that states placed little reliance on the 
Bowel'S decision because most states post-BoweTS had abolished criminal 
prohibitions on private acts of sodomy.133 At the time of Lawrence, only 
four states actually enforced prohibitions targeting homosexuals.134 
The Court also measured "societal reliance on BOWel's" by looking at 
the "emerging awareness" of a liberty interest that provides "substan-
tial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their pri-
vate lives. "135 Departing from Michael H. v. Ge1"ald D.,136 the majority in 
Lawrence looked to the "emerging awareness" of the last twenty-five 
years as the basis for the historical context of their decision, rather 
)29 [d. at 572-73; Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
)30 Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. The Court in Romer applied a rational basis level of review 
and rejected the state's proposed justification because it was "born of animosity toward the 
class of persons affected." [d. at 634. 
)3) Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74. The majority in Lawrence invoked Casey's so-called 
"sweet-mystery-of-life passage." [d. at 574. Reprinted in Lawrence, the passage from Casey 
reads: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart 
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under com-
pulsion of the State. 
[d. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
)32 See id.; Romer, 517 U.S. at 634; Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. Justice Kennedy does not ex-
plain why state courts should have looked to Casey, a case dealing with the right to an abor-
tion and, more nebulously, with the right to autonomy, instead of Bowers, a case directly on 
point with issues 'similar to those encountered in Lawrence. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74. 
)33 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
)34 [d. 
)35 [d. at 572. 
136 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (finding a state law that created 
the irrebuttable presumption that a woman's husband is her child's father did not infringe 
on the biological father's substantive due process rights, granted by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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than looking to the whole of American history or even the history of 
western civilization.137 This "emerging awareness" began before Bowers 
but intensified in the last seventeen years, particularly on the federal 
level with the Court's decisions in Romer and Castry.138 The Court inte-
grated the lack of detrimental reliance placed on Bowers, the mount-
ing criticism of the decision, and subsequent decisions eroding the 
foundation of Bowers in order to disregard stare decisis. 139 As a result, 
the Court in Lawrence boldly announced a revamped stare decisis test 
that questions longstanding substantive due process decisions. 14o 
III. FROM RODRIGUEZ TO LAWRENCE: THE NON-FuNDAMENTAL 
LIBERTY INTEREST IN A MINIMALLY ADEQUATE 
EDUCATION AFTER LA WRENCE 
In Lawrence, the Court masked its level of scrutiny and its finding 
of a right, appealed to international authority, and disregarded the 
137 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. Some proponents of the fundamental right to educa-
tion under the due process clause contend that all of American history, not just the last 
quarter century, demonstrates the yalue attached to this right. Bitensky, supra note 11, at 
592. Professor Bitensky states, "[T]here is a long and pervasive tradition in the United 
States of protecting children's access to public elementary and secondary education, a 
tradition which, therefore, necessarily manifests the exceptional importance which this 
society attaches to children's education." Id. Justice Kennedy's history of legal prohibitions 
on same-sex intercourse differs with Justice Burger's history in Bowers, perhaps only in 
Justice Kennedy's focus on western Europe and the latter half century in America. See Law-
rence, 539 U.S. at 572-74. 
138 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73; Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (reasoning that Colorado can-
not so deem homosexuals "a class of persons stranger to its laws"); Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see Richard G. Wilkins, The Constitutionality of Legal Prefer-
ences for Heterosexual Marriage, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 121, 124 (2003) (reasoning that the 
"broader 'fundamental right' claim premised on the reasoning of Casey fares no better" 
because not "every personal preference connected with 'one's own concept of existence' 
... can (or should) be recognized as a 'fundamental right'"). 
139 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-76. The "mounting criticism" component of the Lawrence 
stare decisis test is by far the least developed by the Court. See id. As a result, this Note con-
siders it the least influential in future substantiYe due process analysis. See id. Justice Scalia 
correctly critiques the Court's specious reasoning, stating: 
Bowers, the Court says, has been subject to "substantial and continuing [criti-
cism] disapproving of its reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical 
assumptions." Exactly what those non historical criticism are, and whether the 
Court even agrees with them, are left unsaid .... Of course, Roe too (and by 
extension Casey) has been (and still is) subject to unrelenting criticism, in-
cluding criticism from the two commentators cited by the Court today. 
Id. at 588-89 (Scalia,]., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
140 See 539 U.S. at 574-76. 
366 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:343 
stare decisis of a historically and culturally outdated preceden t.141 
These three aspects of the decision represent not simply legal reason-
ing peculiar to the Lawrence decision, but a dramatic shift in the 
Court's substantive due process analysis.142 Therefore, if schoolchil-
dren confined to grossly underperforming schools raised a Due Proc-
ess Clause challenge, Justice Kennedy's reasoning in Lawrence suggests 
that the Court may be receptive to a non-fundamental liberty interest 
in a minimally adequate education.143 By relying on the methodology 
of LawTe7lCe, the Court may revisit Rodliguez, modify its outdated hold-
ing, and find that children shackled to abysmally achieving schools 
are constitutionally entitled to a minimally adequate education. l44 
A. Liberty Interests and Judicial Scrutiny After Lawrence: Opening the Door 
to a Minimally Adequate Education 
The lower federal courts have interpreted Rodliguez as holding 
that education is not a fundamental right under the Due Process 
Clause.145 When plaintiffs allege the denial of the fundamental right 
141 See discussion infra Part II. 
142 See Bucholtz, supra note 122, at 77 (reasoning that Lawrence may be a "seminal and 
watershed" event because of its "path-breaking reliance upon international and foreign 
legal authority"); Huhn, supra note 10, at 66 (reasoning that the Lawrence and Grutter deci-
sions "represent a revolutionary shift in the interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States"); Ryan, supra note 15, at 5 (arguing that Lawrence "may well have implica-
tions for constitutional jurisprudence of lasting significance"). 
143 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74; Mark Cenite, Federalizing Or Eliminating Olliine Ob-
scenity Laws as an Alternative to Contemporary Com1llunity Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL'y 25, 
69 (2004) (speculating that the "implications of Lawrence could indeed be wide-ranging"); 
Wilkins, supra note 138, at 137 (arguing that "wherever the road created in Lawrence leads," 
the Court should be "exceptionally wary with any journey into the landscape of mar-
riage"). 
144 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74; Cenite, supra note 143, at 69. 
145 See Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1183 
(2004) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,34 (1973» (reasoning 
that former graduate students' § 1983 action should be dismissed, because alleged conduct 
was insufficient to support a claim for substantive due process violations); Wagner v. Fort 
Wayne Comty. Sch., 255 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (dismissing middle school stu-
dent's civil rights action against school district because the school district did not violate 
the student's substantive due process rights). 
In deciding educational matters, the Supreme Court differentiates the "substantive" 
component of due process from the "procedural" component of due process. See Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). Although states were not obligated under the Constitu-
tion to maintain a public school system, if such a benefit is provided, the state is "con-
strained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education" as an inter-
est protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. This interest "may not be taken away for 
misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that Clause." Id.; 
see, e.g., Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 2d 241, 243 (D.N.H. 2002) (reasoning that a high 
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to education, and frame the allegation in precisely those terms, the 
federal courts summarily dismiss the challenges, relying solely on the 
Court's decision in Rodliguez.146 Lawrence, however, instructs children 
attending grossly underachieving schools, as potential plaintiffs, to 
assert a lesser interest than a "fundamental right to education."147 By 
claiming a less sweeping, more limited liberty interest-the non-
fundamental liberty interest in a minimally adequate education-the 
post-Lawrence Court may provide some constitutional remedy for the 
children in America's worst schools.148 Two reasons support this claim: 
first, if there is debate over the existence of a constitutionally fundamen-
tal light to a minimally adequate education, then surely a nOll-
fundamental liberty intemst in a minimally adequate education-a lesser 
constitutional interest than a fundamental right-must exist;149 and 
second, if this liberty interest is subjected to the same level of scrutiny 
school's procedures for the reinstatement of an expelled student violated student's proce-
dural due process rights). 
146 See, e.g., Galdikas, 342 F.3d at 689; Hi1gIlCl; 255 F. Supp. 2d at 922; Johllsoll, 233 F. 
Supp. 2d at 247. 
147 See 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
148 See id. Rodriguez likely controls the other avenue for substantive due process viola-
tions, the so-called "shocks the conscience" test. See 411 U.S. at 12-13. The "shocks the 
conscience" test has many detractors. See, e.g., Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 
(1998) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (arguing that the test is a "throw back to highly subjective 
substantive-due-process methodologies"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) 
(Black, j., concurring) (reasoning that the test grants the Court "unlimited power to in-
validate laws") The test remains a viable way of asserting a due process violation, but four 
principal reasons exist as to why Rodriguez would dissuade federal courts from employing 
the test. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12-13; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846--48. First, the facts of Rodri-
guez discourage finding other school districts "shocking," because the Court in Rodriguez 
was not moved by the gross disparity between the Alamo Heights Independent School and 
the Edgewood School District. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12-13. Second, courts are reluc-
tant to expand "shocks the conscience" substantive due process "because guideposts for 
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 
U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). Third, many consider the standard of "shocks the conscience" to be 
shaky judicial ground. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976) (arguing that the Due 
Process Clause is "not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions"); 
Abbott & Robinson, supra note 75, at 476; Eric L. Muller, Constitutional ConsciCllce, 83 B.U. 
L. REv. 1017, 1040 (2003) (reasoning that the "shocks-the-conscience test stays with us ... 
but it hangs by a thread"). Fourth, at least one circuit has not decided whether the "shocks 
the conscience" standard applies to all substantive due process violations. See Butler v. Rio 
Rancho Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1201 n.4 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
student's suspension did not violate Due Process Clause, because the suspension did not 
"shock the conscience" of the court). 
149 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586-87 (Scalia,j., dissenting); Bogen, supra note 96, at 388 
(arguing that the Court may be "far more active in imagining fundamental rights beyond 
existing traditions" in future decisions). 
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as LawTence-a review that looked to international recogmtion of 
rights-children in underperforming schools could lay claim to a new 
constitutional interest. 15o 
1. From Fundamental Right to Non-Fundamental Liberty Interest 
Because the right asserted in Rodligllez-the fundamental right to 
education-sweeps far broader than the non-fundamental liberty in-
terest of a minimally adequate education, analysis of the non-
fundamental liberty interest does not begin with Rodliguez.151 Instead, 
Papasan v. Allain offers a better starting point, as it considers whether a 
curtailed fundamental right to a minimally adequate education existed 
at all. 152 To be sure, even alleging an infringement of the unsettled 
right as done by the plaintiffs in Papasan is difficult. 153 The plaintiffs in 
Robinson v. Kansas were at least taught how to "read or write" and re-
ceived "instruction on . . . educational basics," tlms the district court 
did not explore the scope of the undecided fundamental right to a 
minimally adequate education. 1M Similarly, a Pennsylvania district court 
found in Bliall B. v. Pennsylvania DepaTtment of Education that a school-
aged, incarcerated child is not deprived of his or her fundamental right 
to a minimally acceptable education, even if the state withholds all 
forms of education during the incarcerated years.155 Brian B. and Robin-
150 See Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS LJ. 431, 463 
(2002) (reasoning that judicial scrutiny is often "so gossamer that it is akin to the translu-
cent newly shed skin of the snake: It has the form of the snake but none of its substance"). 
151 See, e.g., Galdikas, 342 F.3d at 689; WagnC1; 255 F. Supp. 2d at 915; Johnson, 233 F. 
Supp. 2d at 241. One law professor helps inform what this non-fundament.·tlliberty inter-
est to a minimally adequate education should entail. See Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revis-
ited: Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 GA. L. REV. 475, 540-41 (1997-98). Profes-
sor Foley views education as a necessary precondition for the creation of "philosopher-
citizens." [d. According to Professor Foley, education fails when students leave the system 
not fully versed in the ethic of good citizenship, not knowledgeable about the political 
process and not fluent in general policy discourse. [d. 
152 See 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986). In Papasan, the Court st.·tted that it had "not yet 
definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundament.,l 
right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be ac-
corded heightened equal protection review." [d. 
153 See id.; see also Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1149-50 (D. Kan. 2000). 
154 Robinson, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286) (holding that 
the plaintiffs "failed to allege the facts necessary, under Papasan, in order to receive a 
heightened standard of review under their Equal Protection claim"). The court did not 
note the fact that the plaintiffs did not learn educational basics, but instead commented 
that the state had made some attempt to teach them these basics. [d. 
155 51 F. Supp. 2d 611, 625-26 (E.D. Pa. 1999), a/I'd, 230 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2000) (rea-
soning that the st.,te's "radical abridgement of classroom hours" did not give rise to a Pa-
pasan analysis since there was no denial of education). 
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son are powerful examples of the federal courts' reluctance to decide 
the unsettled fundamental right to a minimally adequate education.l56 
Though the standard for alleging the denial of the fundamental 
right to a minimally adequate education may be daunting, at least one 
federal district court has found the threshold surmountable.157 In 
Donnell C. v. Illinois State Board of Education, the court found that the 
plaintiffs successfully pled the deprivation of education rights guaran-
teed under the Due Process Clause.158 This contrasts with the other 
district court dismissals of plaintiffs' suits in Robinson and Blian B.159 
Moreover, Louisiana ex rei. S.D. cited Donnell C. as standing for the 
proposition that a "lack of instruction gave rise to claim under sub-
stantive due process" and that 'juveniles in correctional facilities have 
a federal constitutional right to an adequate educational program. "160 
There is a practical difficulty with looking to Donnell C. and S.D. as 
supporting a right to a minimally adequate education, because few 
courts have recognized such a right.161 However, the cases are power-
ful proof that some courts will decide the open question posed by Pa-
pasan in the affirmative.162 
If the Papasan Court thought enough of education to leave unset-
tled the right to a minimally adequate education, and if federal courts 
have sometimes recognized the fundamental right to a minimally 
adequate education, then it is reasonable to suggest that the Court 
will confer non-fundamental "liberty interest" status upon a minimally 
156 Robinson, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1148-49; Brian B. y. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 51 F. Supp. 2d 
611,625-26 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
157 See Donnell C. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (N.D. III. 1993). In 
Donnell c., among other claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the state did not provide pretrial 
detainees in need of special educational services with such classes, and that pretrial de-
tainees received instruction in only reading and math. [d. 
158 [d. (reasoning that "the Court cannot say that no relief could be granted plain-
tiffs"). 
159 Robinson, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1149-50; Brian B., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26; Donnell c., 
829 F. Supp. at 1018. Unfortunately for legal observers, the Donnell C. case settled out of 
court, leaving open the question whether the purported claim would have been successful 
at trial. SeeSafier, supra note 12, at 1007. 
160 832 So. 2d 415, 423-35 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
161 Donnell c., 829 F. Supp. at 1018; S.D., 832 So. 2d at 423-35; see also Galdikas, 342 F.3d 
at 689; Wagner, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 915; JOII1lS01l, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 241. Also, the context of 
Donnell c., a prison detainee dispute, is not entirely analogous to disputes over the quality 
of a public school education. See D01/nell c., 829 F. Supp. at 1018. Moreover, D01/nell C. rec-
ognized a lack of education instruction, not substandard educational results, as the reason 
for the claim. See id. 
162 See Donnell c., 829 F. Supp. at 1018; S.D., 832 So. 2d at 423; Safier, supra note 12, at 
1009 (arguing that Donnell C. "helped define the contours" of a fundamental right to a 
minimally adequate education "if it were to be recognized"). 
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adequate education.163 Considering the sympathetic treatment that 
education generally receives from the Court, the Court seems poised 
to recognize the non-fundamental liberty interest in a minimally ade-
quate education.164 
This liberty interest may seem, on its face, to be an awkward fit in 
the Court's largely "privacy"-dominated substantive due process juris-
prudence.165 Lawrence and Casey, however, suggest that autonomy, not 
privacy concerns, motivate the Court's recent substantive due process 
decisions. 166 The Lawrence Court makes plain that the Due Process 
Clause safeguards interests "central to personal dignity and auton-
only" and core to "one's own concept of existence .... "167 Moreover, 
the closing words of Lawrence focus on violations of autonomy inter-
ests, not simply privacy interests: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known 
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they 
might have been more specific .... They knew times can 
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that 
163 Sec Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586-87 (Scalia, j., dissenting); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 
265,285 (1986). 
164 Sec Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954). 
165 Sec Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (reasoning that "[p]ersons in a homosexual relation-
ship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do"); Helen M. 
A1vare, Saying Yes Before Saying "I Do": Premarital Sex and Cohabitation as a Piece of the Divorce 
Puzzle, 18 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 7, 67 n.276 (2004) (reasoning that "the 
Lawrence Court declared that the constitutional right of privacy protected consensual sex-
ual behavior"); Falco, supra note 84, at 750 (arguing that the "due process right to privacy 
... was brought before the Supreme Court in Lawrence, and it was ultimately successful"); 
James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Func-
tional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEU. LJ. 1003, 1042 (2003) (reasoning that Lawrence 
safeguards "a personal righ t of private sexual au tonomy"). 
166 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992); Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to tlte Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Tor-
ture and the mlr on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CaNST. L. 278, 298 (2003) (noting how "Justice Ken-
nedy recently set forth the constitutional importance of the 'autonomy of self' in Lawrence 
v. Texas"); Seema Saifee, Note, Penumbras, Privacy, and the Death of flviorals-Based Legislation: 
Comparing U.S. Constitutional Law with the Inherent Right of Privacy in Islamic Jurisprudence, 27 
FORDHAM INT'L L..J. 370, 372 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Lawrence "subtly 
shifted away from recognizing privacy-related rights towards asserting a stance against all 
morals legislation"). 
167 See 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Cascy, 505 U.S. at 851). But see Robert C. Post, Foreword: 
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 97 (2003) 
(noting that "the theme of autonomy floats weightlessly through Lawrence, invoked but 
never endowed with analytic tradition"). 
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laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress. 168 
371 
When schools fail to provide a minimally adequate education, the 
children lose the opportunity to be autonomous "in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone. "169 
Such a loss of autonomy is indeed the loss of "an important consti-
tutional value."170 Even if the non-fundamental liberty interest in a 
minimally adequate education is a non-privacy application of substan-
tive due process, the failure of such claims is not necessarily assured. l7l 
The liberty interest asserted in this Note targets only grossly underper-
forming schools, and therefore, only seeks a judicial remedy for a nar-
rowly defined subset of schools. The more perplexing issue is whether 
this liberty interest would survive Lawrence's brand of scrutiny. 
2. Application of Lawrence's Global Brand of Scrutiny 
Lawrence portends a "careful scrutiny" of certain socially valuable, 
albeit non-fundamental, liberty interests by taking into account inter-
national authority.172 Under this global brand of scrutiny, the Court 
may recognize a non-fundamental liberty interest in a minimally ade-
quate education against the State's interest. 173 The State's interest is 
assuredly the preservation of "local control" over the financing of 
168 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79; see also Hon. Diarmuid O'Scannlain, Rediscovering 
the Common Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 761 n.17, (2004) (reasoning that Lawrence 
stands for the substantive due process right to sexual autonomy); Bogen, supra note 96, at 
333 n.4 (arguing that Lawrence creates a "fundamental right to autonomy in intimate 
choices"). 
169 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
170 See Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity and Constitutional Theory: Preliminary 
Thoughts on the Role of School Choice and the Autonomy Plillciple, 14J.L. & POL. 411, 452 (1998) 
(reasoning that autonomy "remains an important value to consider in determining the 
nature, shape, and contour of normative constructions of our constitutional doctrine"). 
J7J See Michael]. Phillips, The NOllplivacy Applications of Substantive Due Process, 21 RUT-
GERS LJ. 537, 598 (1990) (arguing that "substantive due process's non-privacy applications 
are less likely to offend majoritarian values . .. [because 1 many of them involYe institu-
tions-e.g., prisons, public schools and universities, mental institutions, public employ-
ers-that are only indirectly subject to majority control in the first place"). 
172 See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 769 (7th Cir. 
2003) (Posner,]., dissenting) (reasoning that "discrimination against sensitive uses is to be 
given more careful, realistic, skeptical scrutiny by the courts than discrimination against 
purely commercial activities"). 
173 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 577-79; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982); Brown, 347 
U.S. at 493. 
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education, similar to the justification asserted in Rodriguez.P4 "Local 
control" may appear off-limits, but many thought the same of "morals 
based" legislation.175 The Court in LawTence was apparently not per-
suaded by either the implications of declaring morality an illegitimate 
interest176 or the ramifications of the decision on principles of federal-
ismP7 The Court in Lawnmce, however, was moved by the interna-
tional recognition of the liberty in terest.178 
With this dramatic step, the Court opened the door to a hitherto 
unavailable argument for reconsidering Rodriguez., namely that the 
courts and governments of western countries overwhelmingly support 
a right to a minimally adequate education, if not a right to education 
in and of itself.179 The Court in LaWTence cast aside the most obvious 
problem that comes from importing authority from foreign jurisdic-
174 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 54 (1973) (reasoning 
that "local t.'lXation for local expenditures" is a sufficiently legitimate st.-He interest); City of 
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d. 40, 62 (R.I. 1995) (reasoning that "the preservation of 
local control [over education] is a legitimate state interest and that the current financing 
system is rationally related to that legitimate interest"). 
175 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 
(1986) (Stevens,J., dissenting». Further, Justice Stevens's dissent argued that "the fact that 
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral 
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... " 478 U.S. at 216 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see Ryan, supra note 15, at 7-8 (arguing that Justice Kennedy 
makes a "historically odd claim" in Lawrence that "the state has no legitimate interest in 
barring conduct because it is deemed to be deviant or immoral"). 
176 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (ScaI4'1,J., dissenting) (arguing that the breadth of this 
holding could signal the end to all morals-based legislation); Cenite, supra note 143, at 25 
(suggesting that Lawrence points "toward elimination of obscenity law entirely"). 
177 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (stating that 
"principles of federalism ... play such an important part in governing the relationship 
between federal courts and state governments"). 
178 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77. There is an overlap between American due process 
jurisprudence and European codified rights. See, e.g., Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 
247 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 47 (1993). In Costello-Roberts, the European Court of Human 
Rights decided that a seven-year-old who received corporal punishment could not claim a 
violation of article 3 (right against inhuman and degrading treatment), article 8 (right of 
privacy), or article 13 (right to effective remedy) of the European Convention. [d. at 54-57; 
see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). The European Court in Costello-Roberts 
looked to the fact that "the English courts would have been in a position to grant him ap-
propriate relief." 247 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 57. Reaching the same result, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Goss also relied in large part on the fact that the student had a remedy in 
state civil court. See 419 U.S. at 574. 
179 See CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 21, art. 14, at 11. One European 
nation with a separate constitutional right to education is Greece. GREECE CON ST. art. 16, 
§ 2. The provision in the Greek Constitution reads, "[e]ducation constitutes a basic mis-
sion for the St.'1te and shall aim at the moral, intellectual, professional and physical train-
ing of Greeks, the development of national and religious consciousness, and at their for-
mation as free and responsible citizens." [d. 
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tions into the analysis of Arnerican constitutional rights, namely that 
this law is simply different. 18o Nonetheless, the Court departed from 
prior substantive due process jurisprudence, suggesting that interna-
tional authority helps establish a constitutional liberty interest,181 
Belgian Linguistics, decided by the European Court of Human 
Rights thirteen years before Rodriguez, demonstrates important inter-
national authority supporting the right to a minimally adequate edu-
cation.182 For the French-speaking parents living in Belgium, Belgian 
Linguistics struck down Belgium legislation that refused public fund-
ing to any French language school in a Flemish dominant-language 
region.183 The European Court of Human Rights stated that the right 
to education "would be meaningless if it did not imply, in favour of its 
beneficiaries, the right to be educated in the national language or in 
one of the national languages, as the case may be. "184 Not only has the 
ED codified a fundamental right to education,185 but its governing 
180 For instance, the courts of South Africa and the Europeau Union require consid-
erably greater socioeconomic rights than does the Supreme Court. Sec l\lark S. Kende, The 
South A.frican Constitutional Court's Embrace of Socioeconomic Rights: it Comparative Perspective, 6 
CHAP. L. REV. 137, 160 (2003) (contending that the "Supreme Court and American schol-
ars could learn much from the South African Constitutional Court's socio-economic deci-
sions"); W. Kent Davis, i1nsweringjustice Ginsburg's Charge That the Constitution Is 'Skimpy' in 
Comparison to our International Neighbors: i1 Compmison of Funda11lental Rights in il.me/iea and 
Foreign Law, 39 S. TEX L. REV. 951, 990 (1998). Davis responds to a speech by Justice Gins-
burg that characterized the U.S. Constitution as "skimpy" on human rights, whereas for-
eign jurisdictions offer more expansive fundamental rights. Id. at 951. Davis believes that 
turning to international law to resolve American fundamental rights could be a disastrous 
enterprise in that fundamental rights "vary because of vast differences in socioeconomic, 
historical and cultural backgrounds among the world's nations." !d. at 990. 
181 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73, 576-77; Leo, supra note 113. For an interesting 
analysis of the many international treaties affirming the right to education that are signed 
by the United States, see Bitensky, supra note II, at 318. 
182 Sec Belgian Linguistics, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 25, 66 (1968). Another scholar 
makes an interesting case for overturning Rodriguez based on its violation of the United 
Nation's Convention on the Rights of the Child. Maria Grahn-Farley, International Child 
Rights at HOllie & /tbmad: it Symposium on the LW Convel/tion 01/ the Rights of the Child, 30 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 657, 709 (2002). Professor Grahn-Farley acknowledges the limitations of this 
approach, but notes that "[a] s the national and international commercial law are increas-
ingly interdependent as a result of globalization, so too may international human rights 
law have an increasing influence on U.S. civil rights." !d. 
183 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25, 66. 
184 Id.; see Kjeldsen, Buck Madsen, & Pederson v. Denmark (Pederson), 23 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) 3,20 (1976).(reasoning that governments must provide "a right of access to 
educational institutions existing at a given time"). 
185 Sec CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 21, art 14, at 11. 
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courts attach certain minimal obligations for governments to meet to 
preserve this right. 186 
Furthermore, the EU Charter clearly establishes the right of all 
persons, regardless of age, to education-a right far broader than a 
mere liberty interest in a minimally adequate level of education.187 
The current right to education for the European Union reads: 
Everyone has the right to education and to have access to 
vocational and continuing training. This right includes the 
possibility to receive free compulsory education. The free-
dom to found educational establishments with due respect 
for democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure 
the education and teaching of their children in conformity 
with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convic-
tions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws 
governing the exercise of such freedom and right. l88 
Belgian Linguistics and the EU Charter, therefore, have created a "posi-
tive right," an unsettling proposition for those who hold the U.S. Con-
stitution to be a "charter of negative rather than positive liberties. "189 
The European Court's decision in Belgian Linguistics, however, estab-
lishes a middle ground between Rodriguez and the recognition of a 
positive right to education.l9o 
In deciding that certain governmental obligations attach to edu-
cation, both the European Court of Human Rights and the EU Char-
ter recognize a liberty interest in a minimally adequate education.191 
As one commentator writes, the right to education found in interna-
tional jurisdictions has evolved "progressively, in stages. "192 The beg-
186 See Belgian Linguistics, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25, 66; Dove v. Scottish Ministers, 
2002 Sess. Cas. 257 (Scot. Extra Div.). In Dove, a Scottish court concluded that the EU's 
right to education should not extend to the management of the school, but only to the 
effectiveness of the instruction. 2002 Sess. Cas. at 265. The Court noted that "art 2 relates 
to the content of the education provided, rather than administrative arrangements for its 
provision." Id. at 266. 
187 See CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 21, art. 14, at 11. 
188 Id. 
189 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (reasoning that the 
Due Process Clauses confers "no affirmative right to government aid, even when such aid 
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself 
may not deprive the individual"); Jackson v.Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). 
190 See Belgian Linguistics, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25, 66 (reasoning that a student 
must be taught in the national language of the country in which the school is located). 
191 See Pederson, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20; Belgian Linguistics, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) at 25, 66; Dove, 2002 Sess. Cas. at 266. 
192 Bitensky, supra note II, at 617. 
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gars of our educational system-those who attend grossly underper-
forming schools in America-cannot be choosers. The Supreme 
Court's first step must be the step the European Court took in Belgian 
Lingllistic~to establish a baseline level of education.193 Under Law-
rence's global brand of scrutiny, therefore, the Court should recognize 
the non-fundamental liberty interest in a rninimally adequate educa-
tion by relying upon the international authority of the EU Charter 
and cases like Belgian Linguistics. 194 
B. H-'hen Precedent Doesn't Bind: Applying Lawrence's 
Stare Decisis Test to Rodriguez 
Under the final remarkable aspect of Lawrence, the Court's new 
stare decisis test, the Rodliguez decision does not bind the Supreme 
Court in deciding the constitutionality of a liberty interest in a mini-
mally adequate education.195 To be sure, the stare decisis test poses 
the same logistical risk faced by all multifactor balancing tests-
namely, which factors weigh the most. 196 However, the two principal 
factors in Lawrence's stare decisis test-the impact of subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions and the degree that states have detrimentally 
relied on the decision-demonstrate that stare decisis privileges 
should not apply to Rodligllez.197 
Two decisions post-dating Rodriguez militate against employing 
stare decisis in our analysis of the liberty interest in a minimally ade-
193 See 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66. Bitensky, supra note 11, at 622 (reasoning that the 
positive right to education "as an international human rights norm has the potential to 
breathe a more complete and rational meaning into the language of these constitutional 
provisions") . 
194 See CHARTER Of FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 21, art. 14, at 11; Belgian Linguis-
tics, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25, 66. 
195 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-78. 
196 See id. The Court referred to a third factor-the "substantial and mounting criti-
cism"-in its analysis, but only used this reasoning to buttress its other claims. Id. This 
Note considers the other two factors to be more efficacious, but there has been "substan-
tial" criticism of the Rodriguez decision. See generallv Bitensky, supra note 11; Foley, supra 
note 15l. 
197 See infra notes 202-229 and accompanying text; see also Robert C. Farrell, Successful 
Rational Basis Claims il1 the Supreme COllrt from the 1971 Term Throllgh Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. 
L. REV. 357, 387 (1999) (noting that in Papasan v. ABai/!, 478 U.S. 265 (1986), the Court 
"did conclude that Rodriguez was not controlling on its facts"); Julius Chamber, Adequate 
Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 55, 68 (1987) (not-
ing that after Papasall, "a strategy for judicial recognition and enforcement of a federal 
right to a minimally adequate education is not precluded by Rodriguez"). 
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quate education,198 Both Papasan and Plyler resulted in "serious ero-
sion" of Rod1iguez's broad holding that no fundamental right to educa-
tion exists in the Constitution,199 Papasan considered "unsettled" the 
narrower right to a minimally adequate education.2oo After Papasan, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the net of Rodliguez does not cast as widely as 
once thought.201 Therefore, a more limited right to education, such as 
the liberty interest in a minimally adequate education, warrants discus-
sion rather than blind deference to precedent.202 Seemingly, Rodriguez 
also would have been dispositive of the issue in Plyle1; the right to edu-
cation for undocumented schoolchildren.203 Instead, the Court again 
embraced a more relaxed view of Rodriguez.204 Plyle1; like Papasan, dem-
onstrates that the Rod1iguez holding is weakest at its margins.205 Similar 
to the way that Casey and Romer eroded Bowers, Papasan and Plyler have 
eroded Rod1iguez.206 The subsequent decisions of the Court, therefore, 
certainly do not foreclose a challenge that asserts the liberty interest in 
a minimally adequate education, a curtailed right to education at the 
margins of Rod1iguez.207 
198 See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 265; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982); Molly S. 
McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Ecollomic lnteg;ration of the Public Schools, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1346 n.75 (2004) (noting that "if plaintiffs could prove that they 
were not receiving a minimally adequate education," Papasan and Plylerwould entitle their 
claims to "heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause"). 
199 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576; Papasall, 478 U.S. at 285; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 (noting 
how the "stigma of illiteracy" would mark the plaintiffs "for the rest of their lives" if the law 
was not changed). 
200 478 U.S. at 285. 
2011d. 
202 See id. 
205 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (noting the "import.'lnce of education in maintaining our 
basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child"). 
204 ld. at 221-23; see Eric P. Christofferson, Note, Rodriguez Reexamined: The lvlisn07ller of 
"Local Control" and a Constitutional Case for Equitable Public School Funding, 90 CEO. LJ. 2553, 
2575 (2002) (arguing that the importance of education in Plyler demonstrates how" Rodri-
guez did not foreclose heightened scrutiny in education cases"). 
205 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (noting that "education has a fundament.'ll role in maintain-
ing the fabric of our society"); see Roni R. Reed, Note, Education and the State Constitutions: 
Alternatives for Suspended alld Expelled Students, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 582, 591 n.74 (1996) 
(reasoning that Plyler "enunciated the importance of education and rested not only on the 
strength of the education right, but also on the consequences of the denial of education to 
the children affected"). 
206 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285. 
207 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-78; Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance 
Litigation, and the "Third "ilve": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151, 1156-57 
(1995) (reasoning that "whether the U.S. Constitution ensures a minimal amount of edu-
cational sen'ices remains the subject of continued debate," and that Plyler "fuels this de-
bate"). 
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Perhaps Justice Kennedy's strongest argument for abandoning 
Bowers, and stare decisis in the process, was that state governments had 
not relied to their detriment upon the seventeen-year-old decision.208 
Justice Kennedy implies that only thirteen state court systems detrimen-
tally relied on Bowers in deciding the merits of state law challenges to 
anti-sodomy laws.209 In the context of a liberty interest in a minimally 
adequate education challenge, tllerefore, Lawnmcc calls for a determi-
nation ofthe degree to which states detrimentally relied on RodligllCZ.210 
Strong, pervasive reliance on RodJigucz by state courts would militate 
against overturning this precedent, whereas scant reliance on Rodligucz 
enables the Court to modify the preceden t of Rodligucz and recognize 
the liberty interest in a minimally adequate education.211 
A survey of state court decisions indicates no significant detri-
mental reliance on Rodligllcz, and therefore, that no stare decisis privi-
leges should apply.212 State courts typically turn to Rodligucz when 
208 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-78. 
209 See id. 
210 Id. at 577 (reasoning that "there has been no indh'idual or societal reliance on Bow-
ers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once there are compelling 
reasons to do so"); cf. Bill Swinford, Shedding the Doctrinal Security Blanket: How State Supreme 
Courts Interpret Their State Constitutions in the Shadow o/Rodriguez, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 981, 992 
n.61 (1995) (noting that "[iJn every case brought before a state supreme court after Rodri-
guez that involved education finance, the state court found Rodriguez to be controlling in 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
211 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-78. One commentator recently also noted how "state 
courts have the ability to influence indirectly the content of nationally guaranteed liberties 
through their rulings under cognate provisions of state constitutions." Gardner, supra note 
165, at 1042. 
212 See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Ciy. A. Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-
0117-R, 1993 WL 204083, at *57 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993); Matanuska-Susitna Borough 
Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 402 (Alaska 1997); Roosevelt Elementary, 877 P.2d 806, 
814 (Ariz. 1994); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 499 (Ark. 2002); 
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 
P.2d. 1241 (Cal. 1971); Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1016-17 (Colo. 
1982); Horton v. Meskill (Horton I), 376 A.2d 359, 371 (Conn. 1977); Coalition for Ade-
quacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996); McDaniel 
v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 646 
(Idaho 1975); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1196 (Ill. 1996); Unified 
Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1189 (Kan. 1994); Rose v. Council for Better 
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Charlet y. Legislature, 713 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. 
App. 1998); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 786 (Md. 1983); 
Sch. Admin. Dist. No.1 v. Comm'r, 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me. 1995); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the 
Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Milliken v. Green (Green II), 212 
N.W.2d 711, 714 (Mich. 1973); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Comm. 
for Educ. Equal. y. State (CEE II), 967 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1998); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. 
No.1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Gould v. Orr, 244 Neb. 163 (Neb. 1993); 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1358-59 (N.H. 1997); 
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there are challenges to state systems for the funding of public educa-
tion based on state constitutional provisions.213 For example, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court grappled with the Rodriguez decision and ulti-
mately rejected its reasoning in the post-Rodriguez ruling on school 
finance, the Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II) decision.214 The court noted, 
"We do not think it open to doubt that the Rodriguez majority had 
Abbot v. Burke (Abbot I), 495 A.2d 376, 389 (NJ. 1985); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 
303 A.2d 273, 282 (NJ. 1973); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 
(N.V. 1995); Bd. of Educ, Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist.. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.V. 
1982); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 260 (N.C. 1997); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No.1 v. 
State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 255 (N.D. 1994); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); 
Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. 
State, 554 P.2d 139, 144-45 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); City of 
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 49 (R.I. 1995); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 
S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Tenn. 
Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 152 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995); Carrollton Farmers Branch 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood III), 826 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. 
1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); 
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 391 (Vt. 1997); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 
(Va. 1994); Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Northshore Sch. 
Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 200 (Wash. 1974); State ex. rei. Bds. of Educ. v. 
Chafin, 376 S.E.2d 113, 117-18 (W. Va. 1988); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (w. v."l. 
1979); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.E.2d 388 (Wis. 2000); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 
579 (Wis. 1989); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Wis. 1976); Lincoln County Sch. 
Dist. No. One v. State, 985 P.2d 964 (Wyo. 1999); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 
P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 
319 (Wyo. 1980). 
213 See, e.g., Serrano IL 557 P.2d at 929. Rodriguez did not close the door on challenges to 
state funding systems. See id. The progenitor of this type of challenge was Serrano L in 
which, prior to Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court found that the state's funding of 
education disproportionately affected those students living in low-tax generating school 
districts. See Serrano L 487 P.2d. at 1241. 
States sometimes turn to Rodriguez when there are alleged violations of st."lte funda-
mental rights and find Rodriguez to be instructive in deciding whether a certain right is 
"fundamental." See, e.g., Hammond v. Comm'r of Corr., 792 A.2d 774, 791 (Conn. 2002) 
(holding that credit for pre-sentence incarceration is not a fundamental right, and citing 
Rodriguez for the principle that "' [i]t is not the province of [the courts] to create substan-
tive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws"); Doe 
v. Superintendent of Schs., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1097-98 (Mass. 1995). The st."lte courts ob-
serve Rodriguez as an example of judicial restraint in the area offundament."ll rights, but do 
not find the restraint exercised in Rodriguez as the motivating reason for not recognizing 
fundamental rights in state law. See, e.g., Webster v. Ryan, 729 N.V.S.2d 315, 433 n.15 (Fam. 
Ct. 2001) (holding that a child had a fundamental right to maint."lin contact with person 
who held a parent-like relationship with the child and citing Rodriguez for the principle 
that "some things that most people would probably consider as a constitutional (or fun-
damental) right are not so at aWl. 
214 557 P.2d at 951. 
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considerable difficulty accommodating its new approach to certain 
prior decisions, especially in the area offundamental rights."215 
Admittedly, Sermno II is the exception to these state funding cases 
in its express rejection of the Rodriguez methodology.216 Yet state su-
preme courts have at most seen Rodliguez as mildly persuasive in de-
ciding whether a state funding scheme violates the respective state 
constitution.217 Some of these courts have adopted the rational basis 
level of scrutiny for issues involving education.218 NorthshoTe School Dis-
tlict No. 417 v. KinneaJ~ the case that relies most heavily on Rodliguez, 
however, is suspect after Seattle School District No. 1 of King County v. 
State.219 In Seattle School Distlict No.1, the Washington Supreme Court 
did not consider Rodriguez to be a "leading" or "controlling" case as it 
mId. 
216 Id. 
217 See Matanuska-Susitna Bmvugh Sch. Dist., 931 P.2d at 402 (reasoning that although 
the Alaska Constitution "is stricter in its protection of individual rights than its federal 
counterpart: the plaintiffs failed to show that they had been disparately affected, unlike 
the "plaintiffs in ... Rodliguez did"); Lujal/, 649 P.2d at 1016-17 (disagreeing with the Rod-
riguez fundamental rights test, but agreeing with the decision's approach to the right to 
education as a prerequisite to the right to vote); Horton I, 376 A.2d at 371 (reasoning that 
significant factual similarities with Rodriguez and referring to the decision as persuasive 
authority "very relevant"); AfcDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 167 (deeming Rodliguez to be an "impor-
tant" case that provides "guidance to the states"); Thompson, 537 P.2d at 646 (agreeing with 
Rodrigucz's cautionary language that if state funding systems are to fall, then other services 
such as police or fire protection "might be subjected to the same fate"); Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 
at 1196 (reasoning that plaintiffs in challenging state funding schemes have failed to carry 
burden announced in Rodrigucz, that discrimination is sufficiently invidious to a funda-
mental right); Unified Seh. Dist. No. 229,885 P.2d at 1189 (agreeing with Rodligucz's conclu-
sion that "'courts should avoid excessive lln'olvement in questions of taxation '"); Seh. 
Admin. Dist. No.1, 659 A.2d at 857 (reasoning that rational basis standard adopted in Rod-
riguez is the most appropriate level of scrutiny); Hornbcck, 458 A.2d at 786 (agreeing with 
Rodrigucz, that "whether a claimed right is fundamental does not turn alone on the relative 
desirability or importance of that right" and that no discriminatory purpose was present in 
the state system of financlllg education); Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 359 (reasoning that Rodri-
guez's legitimate interest, local control, constitutes a sufficient basis for state funding sys-
tem); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 260 (N.C. 1997) (agreelllg with Rodligllcz principle 
that the complexity of the education reform debate militates against finding the state sys-
tem unconstitutional); Olse1l, 554 P.2d at 144-45 (reasoning that existence of some ine-
quality, like that found III Rodriguez, does not provide a reason for striklllg down the entire 
public school funding scheme); NorthsllOre Seh. Dist. No. 417,530 P.2d at 200 (finding the 
school financing scheme to be constitutional and Rodliguez to be both a "leading case" and 
"a direct and controlling ruling"); Chafin, 376 S.E.2d at 117-18 (reasoning that llldividual 
districts could utilize excess levies for education without running afoul of the state equal 
protection clause and citlllg Rodriguez's rational basis review as persuasive). 
218 Scc, c.g., Thompson, 537 P.2d at 646; Seh. Admin. Dist. No.1, 659 A.2d at 857; N.-vquist, 
439 N.E.2d at 359; Chafin, 376 S.E.2d at 117-18. 
219 See Seattle Seh. Dist. No.1 v. State (Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1),585 P.2d 71, 76-77 
(Wash. 1978); NorthsllOre Sell. Dist. No. 417, 530 P.2d at 200. 
380 Boston College Third World LawJournal [Vol. 25:343 
had in NOTthshoTe School District No. 417.220 Instead, Seattle School District 
No. 1 implicitly rejected Rodriguez, finding that "there can be compli-
ance with the State's [constitutional] duty only if there are sufficient 
funds derived through dependable and regular tax sources to permit 
school districts to carry out a basic program of education. "221 
If decisions such as NOTthshoTe School District No. 417 represent a 
high-water mark for state courts' reliance on Rodriguez, that mark has 
never been surpassed.222 The remaining decisions regarding state 
funding systems can be loosely categorized, with each category 
marked by less and less reliance placed on Rodriguez. The first group-
ing consists of decisions that find Rodriguez informative, yet unpersua-
sive in determining the constitutionality of state funding schemes.223 
These decisions typically acknowledge the legal reasoning in Rodri-
guez, such as Justice Powell's level of scrutiny, but ultimately disregard 
this aspect. 224 A second tier observes the federal approach to the fun-
damental right to education, but rejects the Rodriguez approach as in-
applicable to the analysis of state constitutions.225 In this category, the 
220 See Seattle Scll. Dist. No.1, 585 P.2d at 75-76; Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417, 530 P.2d at 
200-01. 
221 See Seattle ScI!. Dist. No.1, 585 P.2d at 76-77. 
222 See infm notes 221-225 and accompanying text. 
223 See Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., 1993 WL 204083, at *57 (reasoning that "Rodri-
{fIlez does not control" because "the question is instead, the nature of the right to educa-
tion under the constitution of Alabama" and that the present system of public schools in 
Alabama violates the state constitution); Lake Fiew Sch. Dist. No. 25,91 S.W.3d at 499 (fol-
lowing the rational basis leyel of review of Rodri{fllez but ultimately finding that the current 
public school funding system violated the state constitution); Claremont 11, 703 A.2d at 
1358-59 (noting the Rodri{fllez approach to fundamental rights, but finding a "[s] tate 
funded constitutionally adequate education is a fundamental right" under the state consti-
tution); Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 282 (reasoning that Rodriguez approach to fundamental 
rights "vulnerable" to criticism in holding that the state funding scheme violates state con-
stitution); Fair ScI!. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc., 746 P.2d at 1149 (rejecting the Rodriguez fun-
damental rights tests as "inappropriate: but finding that equal expenditures per pupil was 
not guaranteed by express terms of the state constitution); Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 494 
(citing Rodri{fllez for the principle that education plays a vital role in society, but ultimately 
finding that state funding scheme based on ad valorem tax yiolated state constitution); Vin-
cent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 414 (Wis. 2000) (noting Rodriguez in that there is no fun-
damental right to education under the Constitution and finding that existing state 
financing scheme did not violate state constitution); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 
(Wis. 1989) (upholding state financing scheme as "consistent with principles articulated by 
the United States Supreme Court in Rodri{fllez"). 
224 See, e.g. Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d at 494. 
225 See Sermno II, 557 P.2d at 951 (reasoning that state funding of education in violation 
of state constitution and sharing the curiosity of Justice Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez); 
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 864 (reasoning that examination of Rodri{flLCz reveals "an embarrass-
ing abundance of authority ... by which the majority might have decided that education is 
a fundamental right of every American"). 
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particular state court cuts its own fundamental rights path without 
regard to the federal approach. 226 Third, there are decisions in which 
the state court merely observes the federal approach in Rodriguez 
without comment, thereby implying very little reliance on Rodliguez.227 
Similarly and lastly, some state courts ignore Rodliguez completely.228 
226 See Serrano II, 55i P.2d at 951; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 864. 
221 See Roosevelt Elementary, 8ii P.2d at 814 (noting that Rodriguez stands for only the 
principle that the U.S. Constitution does not recognize a right to education, but that the 
Arizona Constitution does); Greell IL 212 N.W.2d at i14 (noting that Rodriguez does not 
foreclose state constitutional challenges and finding that state funding does not violate 
state constitution); Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 313 (reasoning that interpretation of state consti-
tution is not limited to those rights the Supreme Court deems fundamental); Abbot L 495 
A.2d at 389 (holding that the Commissioner of Education should first consider the merits 
of the plaintiffs' allegation, but dismiss the wealth-based classification in light of Rodriguez); 
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No.1, 511 N.W.2d at 255 (limiting Rodliguez to federal challenges 
and recognizing that the "state constitution may afford broader rights than those granted 
under the equivalent provision of the federal constitution"); City of Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 
49 (citing Rodliguez for the proposition that the delegates at the 1986 state constitutional 
convention were cognizant of the fundamental right to education, but ultimately such a 
right was rejected); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.'V.2d at 152 (citing Rodriguez for the princi-
ple that "local control" is a sufficient reason for a disparate state spending scheme); 
Brigham, 692 A.2d at 391 (citing Rodriguez, but limiting the decision's importance to the 
U.S. Constitution to when there is a "virtual absence" of an education clause); Bllse, 24i 
N.W.2d at 14i (striking down a redistribution of property tax revenues to poor school 
districts and obseITing that Rodriguez is not controlling since the state constitution has an 
education clause); Washakie County Scll. Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d at 319 (reasoning that the 
state financing system violated state constitution, but noting the decision in Rodliguez). 
228 See Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in ScI!. Funding. Inc., 680 So. 2d at 408 (reason-
ing that the state system did not violate state constitution because plaintiff failed to define 
"adequacy" as a judicially cognizant term); COUllcil for Better Educ .. IIIC., i90 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 
1989) (holding that state's common school system violated state constitution); Charlet. il3 
So. 2d at 1199 (reasoning that state's scheme of funding public schools did not violate 
state constitution); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 516 (holding that the state constitution obli-
gated the Commonwealth to provide an adequate education); CEE II, 96i S.W.2d at 62 
(reasoning that educational funding system did not violate state constitution); Helena Ele-
mentary Sch. Dist. No.1, i69 P.2d at 684 (reasoning that public school funding violated state 
constitutional guarantee of equal educational opportunity); Gould, 506 N.W.2d at 349 
(dismissing challenge to statutory funding scheme because of procedural error); Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity, III C. , 655 N.E.2d at 661 (reasoning that challenge to state funding scheme 
constituted a viable cause of action); DeRolph, 6ii N.E.2d at i33 (reasoning that public 
funding violates constitutional provision of a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools throughout the state); Danson, 399 A.2d at 360 (reasoning that school funding 
scheme did not violate provisions of the state constitution); Abbeville Coullty ScI!. Dist., 515 
S.E.2d at 535 (reasoning that school funding scheme challenge "''as not a cognizable equal 
protection claim); Richland County. 364 S.E.2d at 4iO (reasoning that school funding 
scheme did not violate state constitution by taking into account indh'idual wealth of each 
school district); Edgewood IV; 91 i S.W.2d at ili (reasoning that public school financing 
system did not violate state constitution); Edgewood L iii S.W.2d at 391 (holding that local 
district financing showing a iOO to 1 ratio between districts violated state constitution); 
Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 138 (reasoning that state constitlltion did not mandate "substantial 
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This absence suggests that the outmoded approach of the federal 
government matters little, if at all, to the states. 
In sum, these decisions support the conclusion that there has 
been scant detrimental reliance specifically placed upon the Court's 
1973 decision in Rod'tiguez.229 As a result, the Lawrence stare decisis test, 
as applied to Rodligllez, suggests that the Court need not be bound to 
Rodliguez when evaluating the liberty interest in a minimally adequate 
education. With Rodriguez not foreclosing less sweeping educational 
rights, the Court may be more willing to recognize a liberty interest in 
a minimally adequate education. 
CONCLUSION 
For the last thirty years, San Antonio v. Rodligllez has stood as the 
white elephant in the debate over the fundamental right to minimally 
adequate education; Rodliguez gloomily forecasted that the Due Process 
Clause did not protect this right. Lawrence v. Texas, however, suggests 
that only a mere shadow of the elephan t still remains. If the Supreme 
Court follows LawnJ1lce's global brand of scrutiny and its reconfigured 
stare decisis test, the Court could recognize a non-fundamental liberty 
interest in a minimally adequate education, and in the process, modifY 
the rigid holding of Rodliguez. To be sure, this liberty interest would not 
be a panacea for schools such as C.O. Greenfield Middle School, but it 
would raise awareness, and more importantly, provide some tangible 
remedy for America's forgotten schools. 
equality" of funding between districts); Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 585 P.2d at 77 (reasoning 
that "there can be compliance with the State's [constitutional] duty only if there are 
sufficient funds derived through dependable and regular tax sources to permit school 
districts to carry out a basic program of education"); Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. One, 985 
P.2d at 964 (upholding transition limits placed on wealthy school districts as rationally 
related under equal protection clause of state constitution); Campbell County Sch. Dist., 907 
P.2d at 1238 (reasoning that state funding scheme violated state constitution because dis-
tribution formula resulted in disparity). 
229 See Swinford, supra note 210, at 1001 (noting how "most courts also distanced them-
selves ... from the United States Supreme Court's specific application of the test in the 
context of claims against state systems of education finance"). 
